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Recent events have confronted many of the world's leading central banks with a
situation that was regarded a few decades ago as merely a theoretical curiosity |
a situation in which they have reached a lower bound on the level to which they
are able to push overnight interest rates, despite an undesirably low level of capacity
utilization, and low ination or even fears of deation. The theoretical possibility
of reaching such a situation rst became an all-too-real challenge for the Bank of
Japan in the late 1990s, when even an eventual reduction of the BOJ's target for the
call rate (the overnight rate that had been its operating target until then) to zero
was insucient to halt deation in Japan. But in the wake of the global nancial
crisis, other central banks, notably including the Federal Reserve, have found that
even reductions of their policy rates to the lowest levels that they are willing to
contemplate have been insucient to spur satisfactory recoveries. Most worrisome
of all for the Fed is the fact that, as with Japan, the situation has proven not to be
merely a momentary anomaly; instead, slow growth and lower-than-desired ination
have continued, despite a zero to 25-basis-point target band for the federal funds
rate since December 2008, and there is little optimism about exit from the situation
within the coming year.
It is true that, in these more recent cases, one cannot quite say that overnight
rates have reached their lowest feasible levels, as was arguably true of Japan. What
we have seen in countries like the US is a situation in which overnight rates are
reduced to (or even slightly below) the rate of interest paid on overnight balances at
the central bank, so that further expansions of the supply of bank reserves cannot
bring about any additional material reduction in the level of overnight rates, given
the rate of interest paid on reserves.1 The rate of interest paid on reserves is not
necessarily at its lowest feasible level, but may be set at a level that the central bank
is unwilling to go below, because of fears about the consequences for the functioning
1In the case of the US, the federal funds rate has generally been trading 10-15 basis points
below the rate of interest paid on bank reserves (IOR) held at the Fed (25 basis points). The IOR
has not provided an absolute oor because some institutions with accounts at the Fed (notably
the \government-sponsored enterprises") cannot earn interest on them, and so are willing to lend
overnight at a rate below the IOR, and evidently institutions that can earn the IOR are either
suciently unwilling to borrow further, even to earn a sure return, or have sucient monopsony
power, to not have completely competed away this arbitrage opportunity (Bech and Klee, 2011).
Nonetheless, the spread remains small, despite a massive increase in the supply of reserves (as shown
in Figure 16 below); so it is unlikely that the Fed would be able to push the funds rate much farther
below the IOR, simply by further increasing the supply of reserves.
1
of the money markets of further shrinkage in the small spreads that remain. This is a
prudential concern, rather than an issue of technical feasibility;2 but to the extent that
a central bank determines that such concerns are important, it establishes an eective
lower bound on the policy rate that may be slightly above the technical lower bound,
and the considerations discussed below become relevant. And in any event, even if
a further reduction in the rate of interest paid on reserves should be listed among
the available options for further policy easing in such a case, there clearly is a lower
bound on how far the policy rate can be pushed through further reductions in the
rate of interest paid on reserves, as long as it remains possible to hold currency that,
for institutional reasons, must earn a zero nominal interest rate. Hence the question
whether other options for policy accommodation exist, apart from additional cuts in
the current level of overnight interest rates, has become a pressing one for central
banks like the Federal Reserve.
This paper discusses two of the main alternatives, that have been the focus not
only of considerable recent discussion, but a fair amount of policy experimentation, in
a number of countries. The rst of these is forward guidance| explicit statements by
a central bank about the outlook for future policy, in addition to its announcements
about the immediate policy actions that it is undertaking. While this is not nec-
essarily a dimension of policy that becomes relevant only at the interest-rate lower
bound, the experience of reaching the lower bound has undoubtedly increased the
willingness of central banks like the Fed to experiment with more explicit forms of
forward guidance, making statements about future policy that are both more precise
and quantitative and that refer to policy decisions much farther in the future than
was understood to be intended in the case of past (relatively cryptic) statements
about future policy.
A second broad category of additional dimensions of policy is balance-sheet poli-
cies, in which the central bank varies either the size or the composition of its balance
sheet, even in the absence of any change in its target for overnight interest rates,
2In its response to the global nancial crisis, the BOJ has again substantially increased the supply
of bank reserves (see Figure 15), but unlike the situation in the 2001-06 period of \quantitative
easing" discussed below, this has resulted in a reduction of the overnight rate only to 10 basis
points, rather than to zero, because the BOJ has instituted an IOR of 10 basis points, for reasons
similar to those cited by the Fed for maintaining a positive IOR. The fact that overnight rates were
pushed to zero in the earlier period, when no interest was paid on reserves, indicates that this would
be technically feasible.
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rather than operating in nancial markets purely for the purpose of implementing its
interest-rate target. Some of these additional dimensions of policy are also available in
principle even when the policy rate is not at its lower bound, even if some traditional
doctrines about prudent central banking, such as the \bills only" doctrine (Luckett,
1960) would preclude their use.3 But these too have become a focus of much greater
interest as central banks have sought to provide additional policy accommodation
after reaching the interest-rate lower bound.
To preview the paper's main arguments, I shall suggest that in the case of each of
these broad classes of unconventional measures, caution on the part of central bankers
has frequently led to a preference for versions of the policies that are less likely to be
eective. In the case of forward guidance, it has been tempting for central bankers to
believe that they can aect nancial conditions simply by oering forecasts of likely
future policy, while not really tying their hands with regard to future policy decisions.
But instead, I shall argue that the most eective form of forward guidance involves
advance commitment to denite criteria for future policy decisions.
Similarly, with regard to balance-sheet policies, it has been tempting to believe
that it is possible to use the central bank's balance sheet in a way that is practically
equivalent to conventional interest-rate policy | and that can accordingly inuence
general nancial conditions, without involving the central bank in the allocation of
credit to particular classes of borrowers, or requiring it to purchase assets outside
some narrow class that it conventionally deals in. But instead, I shall argue that the
most eective type of balance-sheet policies seek to more directly channel credit to
particular segments of the market. I shall further argue that the idea that balance-
sheet policies can be used as a substitute for forward guidance, and therefore excuse
a central bank from any need to make commitments about future policy, is mistaken.
Much of the eect of balance-sheet policies seems to have resulted from their being
taken as a signal about likely future policy; and to the extent that this is true, explicit
forward guidance will surely allow the desired eect to be obtained more reliably.
3Even pure quantitative easing | adoption of a target for the supply of bank reserves beyond the
level required to reduce overnight interest rates to the oor established by the the rate of interest
paid on reserves | could in principle be a relevant dimension of policy away from the lower bound, if
it were considered desirable to maintain a high degree of liquidity in the banking system, for reasons
unrelated to the control of short-term interest rates, while using a variable IOR to implement
desired variations in the policy rate. Such an approach to the implementation of interest-rate policy
is recommended, for example, by Goodfriend (2002).
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I consider rst the uses of forward guidance (section 1), then balance-sheet policies
focused on the liabilities of the central bank (\quantitative easing," section 2), and
nally balance-sheet policies focused on the composition of the central bank's assets
(section 3). In each case, I begin by reviewing theoretical arguments for the usefulness
of the additional dimension of policy in question, and then turn to the evidence
regarding their eectiveness that can be gleaned from recent experience. Section 4
oers concluding reections on the challenges currently faced by central banks like
the Federal Reserve.
1 Forward Guidance
Even when a central bank is unable, or at any rate unwilling, to further reduce the
current policy rate, it remains possible for it to change what it communicates about
how the policy rate is likely to be set in the future. This provides, at least potentially,
an additional dimension of policy. But how should it be used? Does not prudence
counsel that a central bank should speak as little as possible about what it might
do under circumstances that it has not yet reached? And if forward guidance is
to be provided, what form is most likely to have desirable short-term eects without
unnecessarily distorting policy decisions later? I shall rst consider theoretical reasons
to provide forward guidance, and then consider the available evidence regarding its
eectiveness in practice.
1.1 Relevance of Forward Guidance in Theory
Should it matter at all what a central bank may say about future policy decisions, as
opposed to what it actually does, or what it may announce about actions that it has
already determined to take, as soon as they can be implemented?4 It is important
to recognize rst that according to standard macroeconomic theory, people's expec-
tations about future policy are a critical aspect of the way in which monetary policy
decisions aect the economy. The overnight interest rates (such as the federal funds
rate in the US) that central banks seek directly to inuence through their routine
market interventions | and decisions about which were the main focus of monetary
policy deliberations, before the interest-rate lower bound was reached | are not in
4The issues reviewed in this section are discussed in greater detail in Woodford (2005).
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themselves of such import for the economic decisions (about spending, hiring, and
price-setting) that the central bank ultimately wishes to inuence.
By this I mean that the level of the overnight rate for the next month or so (which
is all that is ordinarily decided upon at a given meeting of the policy committee)
would not greatly aect these decisions, in the absence of any change in expectations
about short-term interest rates farther in the future. It is instead the anticipated
path of short-term rates, years into the future | as well as longer-term interest
rates, the exchange rate, and other asset prices, all of which should be linked by
arbitrage relations to the expected path of short-term interest rates, rather than
being determined simply by the current level of short rates | that is a more important
determinant of these decisions. Hence even under historical approaches to monetary
policy that did not involve much central-bank communication, the fact that policy-
rate decisions were able to move markets and the economy as much as they did
should be attributed mainly to the fact that a change in the current policy rate
would typically have been taken to have implications for the forward path of interest
rates as well, extending far beyond the next scheduled meeting, even if the central
bank did not explicitly comment on this.
It follows from this view that, even when the current policy rate is constrained
by the lower bound, a variety of dierent short-run outcomes for the economy should
remain possible, depending on what is expected about future policy. Indeed, theory
implies that expectations about future policy should matter even more than usu-
ally in that circumstance | or more precisely, when not only is the lower bound a
currently binding constraint, but there is reason to expect that it may continue to
constrain policy for several more quarters. The reason is that an expectation of an
unchanged nominal interest rate for several quarters, that will be largely insensitive
to the precise evolution of aggregate conditions over that time, creates a situation in
which expectations of aggregate conditions after the interval over which the nominal
rate is expected to be xed have a particularly large eect on the current economy.
Standard New Keynesian models imply that a higher level of expected real income
or ination in the future creates incentives for greater real expenditure and larger price
increases now;5 but in the case of a conventional interest-rate reaction function for
the central bank, short-term interest rates should increase, and the disincentive that
5See, for example, Woodford (2003, chap. 4) for analysis of the mechanisms giving rise to this
result.
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this provides to current expenditure will attenuate (without completely eliminating)
the sensitivity of current conditions to expectations. If nominal interest rates instead
remain unchanged, the degree to which higher expected real income and ination
later produce higher real income and ination now is amplied. If the situation is
expected to persist for a period of time, the degree of amplication should increase
exponentially. Hence it is precisely when the interest-rate lower bound is expected to
be a binding constraint for some time to come that expectations about the conduct
of policy after the constraint ceases to bind should have a particularly large eect
on current economic conditions | to the extent, that is, that it is possible to shift
expectations about conditions that far in the future.6
But even granting that expectations about future conditions should matter, can
central-bank forward guidance do anything to change them? There are two reasons
why it should matter what the central bank says about its future policy. The rst
is that, even in the case of a clear intention on the part of the central bank, it may
not be easy for its intentions to be discerned by the public, and for their implications
for likely future outcomes to understood, without explicit guidance from the central
bank. This is especially likely to be an issue if what one wants people to expect is
that, following a period in which the interest-rate lower bound has required policy
to be tighter than would otherwise have been desired, policy will be looser than it
would otherwise have been (so that the expectation of looser policy later mitigates
the eects of the undesirably high short-term real rates while the constraint binds).
In such a case, one wants people to understand that the central bank's policy
will be history-dependent in a particular way | it will behave dierently than it
usually would, under the conditions prevailing later, simply because of the binding
constraint in the past. But this is a complex type of behavior for people to have come
to anticipate simply from observing the bank's typical conduct, and the situation in
question is one that has seldom if ever arisen before. Moreover, if the intention to
behave in this way going forward is formulated only after the lower bound has been
reached, one would be wishing for people to understand an intention that could not
actually be put into practice until later. This is unlikely to occur without explicit
6This is the reason why, in the numerical simulations of Eggertsson and Woodford (2003), even
the expectation of a modest inationary boom immediately following the return of the natural rate
of interest to its normal level has a dramatic eect on the severity of both the economic contraction
and the deation that occur during the period of the negative natural rate.
6
discussion by the central bank of its intention to conduct policy later in the history-
dependent way.
A second reason why forward guidance may be needed | that again has partic-
ular force when the interest-rate lower bound is reached | is in order to facilitate
commitment on the part of the central bank. As Krugman (1998) emphasizes using
a simple two-period model, and Eggertsson and Woodford (2003) show in the con-
text of a more fully articulated dynamic model, the future policy that one wishes for
people to anticipate is one that the central bank will not have a motive to implement
later, if it makes its decisions then in a purely forward-looking way, on the basis of
its usual stabilization objectives. Hence a desirable outcome requires commitment,
just as in the analysis of Kydland and Prescott (1977) | even though in this case,
the problem is a lack of motive ex post to be as expansionary as one wanted people
earlier to expect, rather than a lack of motive ex post to control ination as tightly as
one wanted them to expect. In practice, the most logical way to make such commit-
ment achievable and credible is by publicly stating the commitment, in a way that is
suciently unambiguous to make it embarrassing for policymakers to simply ignore
the existence of the commitment when making decisions at a later time.
These considerations establish a straightforward case for the benets that should
be attainable, at least in principle, from the right kind of advance discussion of
future policy intentions. On the other hand, some caution is appropriate as to the
conditions under which such an approach should be expected to work. It does not
make sense to suppose that merely expressing the view of the economy's future path
that the central bank would currently wish for people to believe will automatically
make them believe it. If speech were enough, without any demonstrable intention to
act dierently as well, this would be magic indeed | for it would allow the central
bank to stimulate greater spending while constrained by the interest-rate lower bound,
by telling people that they should expect expansionary policy later, and then also
fully achieve its subsequent stabilization objectives, by behaving in a way that is
appropriate to conditions at the time and paying no attention to past forecasts. But
there would be no reason for people believe central-bank speech oered in that spirit.
Hence it is important, under such an approach to policy, that the central bank
not merely give thought to the future course of conduct that it would like for people
to anticipate, and oer this is as a forecast that it would like them to believe. It must
also think about how it intends to approach policy decisions in the future, so that the
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policy that it wants people to anticipate will actually be put into eect, and about
how the fact that this history-dependent approach to policy has been institutionalized
can be made visible to people outside its own building. These matters are not simple
ones, and require considerable attention to the way the central bank communicates
about its objectives, procedures and decisions. The problem is all the more dicult
when one must communicate about how an unprecedented situation will be dealt
with.
1.2 Eectiveness of Forward Guidance in Practice
It seems clear enough in theory that, if a central bank can inuence expectations
about future policy, this should be an important addition to its toolkit. But to what
extent are central-bank announcements actually able to inuence expectations in the
way that a central bank desires? The question is not a simple one to answer, but
recent events provide many more examples of attempts at forward guidance, so that
at least some grains of empirical evidence are now available.
1.2.1 Does Central Bank Speech Matter?
A rst empirical question is simply, how condent can we be that attempts at for-
ward guidance matter at all? Do statements by a central bank actually change the
expectations of market participants, and hence economic outcomes, or do only the
bank's actual trades matter, and not what it may say about them? The most inu-
ential approach to this question has been the one pioneered by Gurkaynak, Sack and
Swanson (2005). Their work looks at whether market expectations of the forward
path of the U.S. federal funds rate seem to change over a narrow time window around
the release of a post-meeting statement by the Federal Open Market Committee; the
idea is that if the window is narrow enough, one can be fairly condent that the only
important \news" that should have changed expectations over this time interval was
the news in the FOMC statement.
The method cannot, by its nature, reveal anything about why market participants
forecast a dierent forward path for interest rates after release of the statement,
or which aspect of the statement constitutes the news that changes their beliefs;
but it can test the null hypotheses that FOMC announcements do not change the
expectations of market participants at all (that speech is irrelevant), or that the only
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news in a post-meeting statement is the revelation of the new (current) operating
target for the federal funds rate. Any eects on market prices during a suciently
narrow window must indicate an eect of speech, since the Fed will not yet have
conducted any trades to implement the new policy; and even over a longer window
(say, a two-day window), any market movements that cannot be predicted by the
news about the new operating target alone must indicate an eect of speech, since
the change in the Trading Desk's behavior in the market will depend only on the
new operating target. Movements of the latter kind further provide evidence that
the announcement of the new target is not the only kind of speech that inuences
expectations, and so justify consideration of what else a central bank might speak
about.
Gurkaynak et al. use changes in fed funds futures prices to infer the change af-
ter each announcement in market expectations for the funds rate at various future
horizons. They use principal components analysis to extract the two most important
\factors" explaining movements in the forecasted funds rate at the various horizons,
and orthogonalize these two factors so that the loading on one factor (the \target"
factor) is equal to the change in the forecast of the current fed funds target (the one
that will apply immediately after the meeting), while the other factor (the \path"
factor) involves no change in the forecast of the current target, only changes in fore-
casts of the funds rate at horizons farther in the future. Under the null hypothesis of
no eect of the statements on expectations, there should be no appreciable variation
in either factor. Under the null hypothesis that the only news is the revelation of
the current target, all variations in the forecasted path of the funds rate should be
accounted for by the \target" factor alone.
Instead, Gurkaynak et al. nd that the \path" factor accounts for an important
degree of variation in funds rate forecasts.7 More recently, Campbell et al. (2012)
extend the work of Gurkaynak et al. to a longer data sample, and nd similar results.
For their sample of statements between February 1994 and June 2007 (i.e., from the
time that the FOMC began issuing a statement about the policy decision after each
meeting, until the onset of the subprime crisis), they nd that the \path" factor
accounts for 67 percent of the variation in the expected funds rate two quarters in
the future, and 90 percent of variation in the expected funds rate four quarters in
7See also the discussion of these results in Bernanke et al. (2004), who develop their implications
for the usefulness of forward guidance when policy is constrained by the zero lower bound.
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the future. For their sample of statements between August 2007 and December 2011
(treated separately because of the numerous novel aspects of communication policy
during and since the crisis), the \path factor" is associated with changes in the
expected funds rate farther in the future, but continues to be important: it accounts
for 53 percent of variation in forecasts four quarters in the future, and 79 percent six
quarters out.
This indicates that FOMC announcements were able to shift expectations about
the future path of the funds rate, and not simply through the announcement of a new
current target. Some other aspect of the announcement must have been conveying
information about future policy, over and above whatever inference about future
policy could be made on the basis of the new funds rate target itself. These changes
in expectations about future policy furthermore aected behavior, at least in asset
markets, for Gurkaynak et al. also nd that their \path" factor is correlated with
changes in Treasury yields over the same time window. Campbell et al. conrm this,
and also nd highly signicant eects on corporate bond yields.
Nonetheless, an important limitation of this approach is that it provides no infor-
mation about what aspect of FOMC statements inuences expectations. Do market
participants accept at face value what the FOMC declares about future policy, or
do they form their own inferences about likely FOMC policy from other clues in the
statements? More importantly, do forecasts of the future funds rate change because
beliefs about the FOMC's reaction function change as a result of the statement, or be-
cause forecasts of future economic conditions that are expected to determine FOMC
policy change, as a result of inferences that are made about information that must
be available to the FOMC? The latter question is important in order to determine
whether statements can change expectations about the way that a central bank will
conduct policy in the future, the goal of \forward guidance."
In at least some cases, the timing of the forecast changes does coincide with at-
tempts by the FOMC to provide explicit forward guidance about policy. For example,
Campbell et al. note that the largest value of the Gurkaynak et al. (2005) path factor
occurred on January 28, 2004, which was a meeting at which the funds rate target
(which had been held constant at a oor of 1 percent since the previous June) was not
changed, but the reference to maintaining policy accommodation \for a considerable
period," included in each post-meeting statement since the previous August, was re-
placed by a declaration that \the Committee believes it can be patient in removing
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policy accommodation." It seems likely that the substantial change in funds rate
expectations (despite no change in the current target and no surprise in that regard)
was mainly due to this change in language, which was evidently taken to indicate
that the FOMC would begin raising the funds rate target soon than had previously
been expected. But even in such a case, one cannot easily say whether this reected
successful signaling of a change in the FOMC's reaction function, or simply an infer-
ence that the change in language indicated that the FOMC's information predicted
a stronger economy.
Reasons for doubt are provided by the results of Campbell et al. on the extent to
which the news in FOMC statements predicts revisions (in the next month's survey) of
forecasts of unemployment and CPI ination in the Blue Chip Economic Indicators
forecast survey. They nd that positive values of both the target factor and path
factor are associated with downward revisions of unemployment forecasts, and upward
revisions of ination forecasts, in the next month's survey after the FOMC statement
in question. Both signs are opposite to what one would expect if the news that lead
to a higher expected path of the federal funds rate was a shift in the FOMC reaction
toward tighter policy under given economic conditions, but exactly what one would
expect if there were no change in beliefs about the reaction function, but news that
the economy was likely to be stronger than previously expected. Of course, there
could be some news of both kinds; but one cannot say that these results provide clear
evidence of an ability to change beliefs about the reaction function.
This is a pervasive problem with attempts to infer from the empirical evidence
what the eects of forward guidance have been; but it is particularly severe when
there is no way to judge what sort of signal about future policy a given central-bank
announcement should have been. For this reason, in what follows I shall focus on
occasions on which central banks not only made public statements, but deliberately
attempted to send a particular message about future policy.
1.2.2 Consequences of Explicit Forward Guidance
The occasions during the recent crisis on which central banks have indicated that
they expected to maintain a xed policy rate for a specic period of time are of par-
ticular interest for purposes of our inquiry. These are especially dramatic examples of
attempts at forward guidance, making a clear break from \business as usual;" more-
over, the import of what is said for the future path of the policy rate is quite explicit
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and easily summarized. It is therefore of interest to consider what has happened
on these occasions, even if one cannot do formal hypothesis tests with such a small
sample of events, each rather unique.
A particularly explicit example of forward guidance was the Bank of Canada's
statement on April 21, 2009, which announced the following:
The Bank of Canada today announced that it is lowering its target for
the overnight rate by one-quarter of a percentage point to 1/4 per cent,
which the Bank judges to be the eective lower bound for that rate....
With monetary policy now operating at the eective lower bound for
the overnight policy rate, it is appropriate to provide more explicit
guidance than is usual regarding its future path so as to inuence rates
at longer maturities. Conditional on the outlook for ination, the target
overnight rate can be expected to remain at its current level until the
end of the second quarter of 2010 in order to achieve the ination target.
While the statement included the announcement of a reduction in the current target
rate, it also oered explicit guidance about where the target should be expected to
be, extending more than a year into the future. The release of the statement had
an almost instantaneous eect on market expectations about the future path of the
policy rate, as indicated by trading in overnight interest-rate swap (OIS) contracts
(Figure 1).
The tick-by-tick transactions data plotted in the gure show that market OIS
rates fell almost instantaneously at the time that the announcement was made (9:00
AM EST, shown by the vertical line). This was evidently an eect of the statement;
yet since the statement included the announcement of an immediate target rate re-
duction, one might wonder if the moves in the OIS rates reected simply the typical
implications of a cut in the current target for rates months in the future, rather than
any additional eects of the \conditional commitment." It is useful to note not only
that OIS rates for maturities as long as six to twelve months fall, but that the longer
maturities fall more; that is, not only does the OIS yield curve fall in response to the
announcement, but it attens. This implies either that expectations of policy rates
for months in early 2010 fall even more than do nearer-term expectations, or that
uncertainty about the path of the policy rate over the coming year has been sub-
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Figure 1: Intraday OIS rates in Canada on April 21, 2009. The dotted vertical line
indicates the time of release of the Bank of Canada's announcement of its \conditional
commitment" to maintain its policy rate target at 25 basis points through the end of
the second quarter of 2010. Source: Bloomberg.
stantially reduced (reducing the term premium). Either of these interpretations is a
plausible consequence of the Bank's unprecedented (albeit conditional) commitment
to a particular value for the policy rate over the coming year, on the assumption that
it is (at least partially) believed; neither would be expected to follow from a simple
announcement of a cut in the current policy rate, which would typically steepen the
yield curve.
The apparent eect on expected future interest rates persisted for at least several
weeks following this announcement. Figure 2 plots the path over the course of 2009
of a forward rate f
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Figure 2: The forward rate (for the period between 6 and 12 months in the future)
implied by the term structure of OIS rates (see text for explanation), for both the
Canadian dollar and the US dollar, over the course of 2009. The dotted vertical line
marks the date of the announcement of the Bank of Canada's \conditional commit-
ment." Daily data. Source: Bloomberg.
market forecast of the average overnight policy rate over the next n months,8 then
f
(t+6;12)
t would correspond to the market forecast of the average policy rate over a
time window between 6 and 12 months in the future. The gure shows that this
forward rate falls by 10 to 15 basis points on the date of the announcement (shown
by the vertical line), and also that it remains at roughly its new level for the next
several weeks. Moreover, there is no similar decline in the corresponding US forward
rate during those weeks (as Chehal and Trehan, 2009, also note); this suggests that
changed expectations about future Bank of Canada policy, rather than news about
the economic outlook (which is typically highly correlated with the outlook for the




This seems a fairly clear example of interest-rate expectations being changed by
explicit forward guidance from a central bank. It should not surprise one that the
clearest such evidence occurs in the case where a central bank most clearly indicated
its intention to provide such guidance | both referring to its statement as having
made a \conditional commitment"9 rather than simply oering a forecast, and stating
its intention to \provide more explicit guidance" in order to \inuence [longer-term]
rates." Yet even in this case, market beliefs do not simply come to accept that the
announced path for the policy rate will be followed with certainty. One observes in
Figure 1 that while the OIS rates for maturities between 6 and 12 months all fall, the
rates for 10 and 12-month maturities do not fall all the way to 25 basis points, even
though the announced path involves a policy rate of 25 basis points extending more
than 12 months into the future.
One might say that this means that the Bank's commitment is not completely
credible. Actually, the Bank did not purport to make an ironclad commitment; it
consistently refers to having made a \conditional commitment," and the condition-
ality on \the ination outlook" is clear in the part of the statement quoted above. It
appears that, at the time of the announcement, the escape clause was not expected
to be invoked with any very great probability within the coming six months, but that
a somewhat higher chance of a rise in ination triggering early termination of the
commitment was allowed for over the 12-month horizon.
One also observes from Figure 2 that, during the rst week of June the forward
rate shot up again, to a level greater than 50 basis points (and higher than in the
period before the \conditional commitment"). Since at this point in time, the period
to which the commitment applied still included all of the next 12 months, one can only
conclude that markets had developed more serious doubts about whether the policy
rate would really remain at the oor through June 2010. These seem to have resulted
from developments in the US; the gure also shows that the corresponding US forward
rate shot up by an even larger amount. The spike in US OIS rates occurred on June
5, 2009, in response to a better-than-expected US Department of Labor report that
\raised hopes" that the US economy was \on the road to recovery," according to the
Financial Times (Guha et al., 2009), and resulted in \the futures market pricing in
at least one rate increase by the Fed by the end of the year," despite protests by
9The word \commitment" is used in the title of the press release, as well as in the text.
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Fed ocials that such talk was premature. Traders in Canadian dollar OIS contracts
were evidently either skeptical that the Bank of Canada would fail to follow such
a move by the Fed, or expected that rapid improvement in the US economy would
bring similar consequences for the Canadian economy, and hence a change in the
outlook for Canadian ination. In the latter case, they did not necessarily disbelieve
the conditional commitment; but it became less the determinant of their interest-rate
expectations, as the likelihood of the relevance of the escape clause increased.
The recent experiments of the Federal Reserve with announcements that the fed-
eral funds rate is expected to remain at its current oor for a stated period of time
have similarly had measurable eects on market expectations of the future path of
the funds rate, as illustrated for example by OIS rates. As I discuss further in the
next section, these statements by the FOMC have had less of the character of an an-
nouncement of a policy intention than was true of the Bank of Canada's \conditional
commitment"; instead, the FOMC has been careful only to oer a forecast of what
is most likely to occur, given its current information. Nonetheless, these statements
as well have clearly moved market expectations.
The FOMC began using forward guidance as soon as the zero lower bound was
reached. In its post-meeting statement released on December 16, 2008, it announced
that the funds rate target was being cut to what has thus far been its lower bound,
namely a band between zero and 25 basis points (with interest being paid on reserves
at a rate of 25 basis points); but the same statement announced that this level of the
target was expected to be maintained \for some time." In its statement of March
18, 2009, this declaration was strengthened (without any change in the target band),
to state that conditions were likely to warrant a low funds rate \for an extended
period." (These indications, not specifying an exact time period, were similar in style
to the FOMC's reference, beginning in August 2003, to maintaining accommodation
\for a considerable period," as an alternative to further cuts in the current funds
rate target.10) A more aggressive form of forward guidance was rst adopted in the
statement of August 9, 2011, in which the main news was the line: \The Committee
currently anticipates that economic conditions ... are likely to warrant exceptionally
low levels of the federal funds rate at least through mid-2013." The forward guidance
was further strengthened in the statement released on January 25, 2012, to say \...
at least through late 2014."
10See Woodford (2005) for discussion of this earlier episode.
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Figure 3: Intraday US dollar OIS rates on August 9, 2011. The dotted vertical line
indicates the time of release of the FOMC statement indicating an expectation that
the funds rate target would remain unchanged \at least through mid-2013." Source:
Bloomberg.
Each of the four statements just mentioned led to a lower expected path for the
federal funds rate, as indicated by the response of OIS rates at the time of the release.
The \cleanest" tests of the eects of forward guidance were the last two instances; not
only did these statements both include very precise specications of a future funds
rate path quite far into the future | that in each case made a stronger statement
than the Committee had previously been willing to make, and came as something of a
surprise | but in these cases, unlike the rst two, the statement did not also contain
important policy changes of any other sort at the same time.11 Figures 3 and 4 show
11The statement on December 16, 2008 had, among other things, announced a substantial cut
in the current funds rate target; abandoned the FOMC's previous practice of announcing a point
target, in favor of a band; and announced that the Fed would \purchase large quantities of agency
debt and mortgage-backed securities." The statement on March 18, 2009, had not announced any
change in the funds rate target, but specied the amounts of various types of long-term securities
17
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Figure 4: Intraday US dollar OIS rates on January 25, 2012. The dotted vertical line
indicates the time of release of the FOMC statement indicating an expectation that
the funds rate target would remain unchanged \at least through late 2014." Source:
Bloomberg.
intraday data for US dollar OIS contracts, on the days that these two statements
were released. In each case, there is a clear, immediate eect on expectations of the
future path of the funds rate: OIS rates fall, despite the fact that the current funds
rate target remained unchanged.
Moreover, there is a clear attening of the OIS yield curve in each case. In Figure
3, the 6-month OIS rate is essentially unaected (it continues to trade in the area
of 9 basis points); this makes sense, given that the FOMC had already indicated
that its existing target (which had resulted in a funds rate a little below 10 basis
points) should be maintained \for an extended period" (evidently taken to mean
at least 6 months). Longer-term OIS rates (especially the 18-month and two-year
rates) immediately fall, however, to levels barely above 10 basis points; this is what
that would be purchased.
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one would expect if market participants believed that the FOMC would with high
probability maintain its current target for two years into the future. In Figure 4,
the one-year OIS rate (now trading just above 10 basis points) is barely aected; this
makes sense, given that the FOMC's existing forward guidance already extended more
than a year into the future (\at least through mid-2013"). The two-year, three-year,
and ve-year rates instead immediately decline; these contracts all relate to periods
that were not completely covered by the already existing forward guidance, so that
the extension of the horizon through late 2014 should have mattered, if believed, for
the pricing of these contracts.
It is true that in Figure 4, the two-year and three-year OIS do not fall all the way
to the level of the one-year rate,12 despite the fact that the FOMC now announced
that it anticipated maintaining its target unchanged for a period extending nearly
three years into the future. Evidently market participants did not attach a 100
percent probability to maintenance of an unchanged target for that long. But as
in the case of the Bank of Canada's forward guidance, one cannot really say that
this shows that they did not believe what they were told, for the FOMC did not
commit itself to maintain the target come what may for that period of time; it stated
only that it anticipated conditions that would warrant such behavior. (There is a
clear implication that not all conditions would.) The statement does seem to have
had a denite impact on the expected forward path of the funds rate over a horizon
extending years into the future, despite the fact that it was far from an unconditional
commitment.
Additional evidence that the FOMC's statements inuenced the beliefs of market
participants about future policy can be found in the Blue Chip survey of professional
forecasters, as noted by Swanson and Williams (2012). Figure 5 shows the median
response of survey participants on successive survey rounds to a question about the
number of quarters until the FOMC would rst increase the federal funds rate target
above 25 basis points. After December 2008, when the target was reduced to 0-25
basis points and the FOMC announced that it should remain there \for some time,"
the median expectation of the length of time that the target should remain there
jumped to four quarters, and it continued to uctuate mainly between three and four
12Note that in the gure, the three-year rate has been shifted down by 10 basis points, in order to
show the several series on a single graph. This contract continues to trade at a rate above 20 basis
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Figure 5: Median forecast of respondents in the Blue Chip Financial Forecasts survey,
of the number of quarters until the federal funds rate target will exceed 25 basis points.
Vertical line indicates the release of the rst FOMC statement indicating continuing
accommodation until \mid-2013." Source: Swanson and Williams (2012).
quarters (and never outside the range of two to ve quarters) for the next two and
a half years. After the FOMC's introduction of the \mid-2013" language in August
2011, instead, the median Blue Chip forecast of the length of time that the target
would remain unchanged jumped to seven or more quarters, in accordance with the
new FOMC prediction, and has continued at that level (a full year longer than the
previous consensus) since then. This indicates a clear eect of the FOMC forward
guidance, and suggests that outside forecasters accepted the validity of the FOMC's
assessment as the best currently available forecast.
Swanson and Williams present additional interesting evidence of the credibility
of the FOMC's explicit forward guidance. Using daily data on interest-rate options
with a variety of strike prices and ve quarters to maturity, they compute an implied
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Figure 6: Probability of a fed funds rate below 50 basis points, at a date ve quarters
in the future, as inferred from interest-rate options prices. Source: Swanson and
Williams (2012).
future, for each trading day. The implied probability of a funds rate below 50 basis
points ve quarters in the future is shown in Figure 6. The probability spikes up, and
remains between 80 and 90 percent on most days, after the FOMC's introduction of
the \mid-2013" language, consistent with the consensus of the Blue Chip forecasters
shown in the previous gure.
Swanson and Williams also measure the eects of surprises in various types of
macroeconomic data releases on Eurodollar futures prices. (These contracts settle
based on the three-month term Eurodollar rate at the date of expiration, and so the
price at which such a contract currently trades can be viewed as providing a measure
of market expectations of the average level of the funds rate over a three-month
window a certain distance in the future.13) By looking at how an overall measure
13See Gurkaynak et al. (2007a) for analysis of the usefulness of Eurodollar futures prices as
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Figure 7: Index of the sensitivity of Eurodollar futures prices to macroeconomic data
surprises, in the case of a contract settling one to two quarters in the future. Here 1
(the horizontal dotted line) indicates the mean sensitivity over the period 1990-2000;
the thin lines represent a 95% condence interval. Vertical lines indicate the dates of
changes in the FOMC's forward guidance. Source: Swanson and Williams (2012).
of the sensitivity of the futures prices to macroeconomic news varies over time (by
plotting the regression coecient obtained using a rolling window centered at each
date),14 it is possible to observe the degree to which market participants believe that
the level of future overnight interest rates will be state-contingent. In periods when
FOMC forward guidance forecasts a specic time-dependent path for the funds rate
target, the degree of sensitivity of such expectations to news can provide a measure of
the degree to which market participants are condent that the announced funds-rate
path will actually be followed.
Based on the response of Eurodollar futures, they conclude that market expec-
14See Swanson and Williams (2012) for details of how the sensitivity index plotted in Figures 7
and 8 is constructed.
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tations regarding overnight rates over a three-month window beginning one to two
quarters in the future became substantially less sensitive to macroeconomic news dur-
ing the period in 2003 when the FOMC cut its funds rate target to unprecedentedly
low levels (eventually as low as one percent), but showed no appetite for further cuts;
became again about as sensitive as usual in 2004 as anticipation of rate increases
(of an unknown timing and speed) grew; and became signicantly less sensitive than
usual again in 2005 and early 2006, when the FOMC steadily increased its target
at the \measured pace" of 25 basis points per meeting. The sensitivity measure has
fallen especially sharply during the recent period of increased forward guidance, and
has been insignicantly dierent from zero since the introduction of the \mid-2013"
language in August 2011.15 This suggests that FOMC forward guidance has shaped
expectations about the path of the funds rate over the next few months in a way that
makes such expectations relatively insensitive to other macroeconomic developments.
Expectations about overnight rates farther in the future were instead apparently
less aected by the kind of forward guidance used earlier in the decade; the corre-
sponding sensitivity measure based on longer-horizon Eurodollar futures is not sig-
nicantly lower than its average value over the decade at any point during the period
2001-2010 (see Figure 8 for an example). However, the sensitivity of expectations
over a three-month window beginning four to ve quarters in the future falls to a
level signicantly less than its average value after the introduction of the \mid-2013"
language, as shown in Figure 8;16 and the sensitivity becomes even lower (a small
fraction of the normal level, according to the point estimate, and only barely sig-
nicantly dierent from zero) after the introduction of the \late 2014" language in
January 2012. This suggests that the more explicit (and longer-horizon) form of
15After this point, the condence interval includes a zero value for the sensitivity index. Note
that negative values of the sensitivity index are possible, indicating responses to macroeconomic
data surprises with a sign opposite to the usual one. Note also that in the gure, the sensitivity
index is estimated to fall to a value insignicantly greater than zero slightly before the date of
the FOMC's new forward guidance. This may, however, simply reect the fact that Swanson and
Williams estimate the coecient for each date using a one-year centered rolling window, so that
reduced sensitivity after the August 2011 announcement is also reected in the estimated sensitivity
coecients over a period up to six months prior to the announcement.
16Again, the drop in the sensitivity coecient appears in the gure to occur slightly before the
timing of the FOMC statement; but this is probably due to the use of a centered rolling window to
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Figure 8: Index of the sensitivity of Eurodollar futures prices to macroeconomic data
surprises, in the case of a contract settling four to ve quarters in the future. Format
as in Figure 7. Source: Swanson and Williams (2012).
forward guidance used by the FOMC more recently has been able to create denite
expectations about the future path of the funds rate than was possible using its ear-
lier approach to forward guidance (to which it had essentially returned in 2009 and
2010).
Of course, one must note that these changes in FOMC forward guidance do
not represent controlled experiments; the FOMC's willingness to experiment with
stronger forms of forward guidance was a consequence of a continuing stream of dis-
couraging macroeconomic news. Hence while market movements during a very short
time window around an announcement can reasonably be attributed to news con-
tained in the announcement, developments since 2010 of the kind shown in Figures 5
through 8 might alternatively be attributed simply to market participants' increasing
doubts that conditions would warrant an increase in the funds rate target anytime
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soon, for reasons unrelated to the FOMC's statements.17 And even to the extent that
one accepts that the timing of the changes in expectations suggests that the FOMC's
changes in communication policy were an important part of the news, there remains
the question whether what this conveyed was news about the economic outlook or
news about the FOMC's approach to the conduct of policy. I return to this issue in
section 1.3 below.
1.2.3 Consequences of Announcements of Central-Bank Policy-Rate Pro-
jections
Further evidence about the extent to which forward guidance can not only aect
beliefs, but can more specically cause people to believe what the central bank says,
is provided by central banks that announce a forward path for their policy rate as a
routine part of their communication about their policy decisions. The Reserve Bank
of New Zealand has announced its forecast of future short-term interest rates since
1997, much longer than any other central bank; there is consequently the greatest
amount of data on the eects of such announcements in its case.
Moessner and Nelson (2008) test econometrically the degree to which the RBNZ's
announcements aect market expectations, using futures contracts for 90-day bank
bills (the money-market instrument for which the RBNZ forecasts future yields) de-
liverable at various future dates as proxies for market expectations. They estimate a
regression of the form
fn;t   fn;t 1 = + (f cbn;t   Et 1f cbn;t) + t;
where fn;t is the futures rate at the end of day t for a contract specifying delivery
n quarters in the future; f cbn;t is the RBNZ's forecast of the 90-day bank bill rate n
quarters in the future, released on day t; and Et 1f cbn;t is the market's expectation of
what the Reserve Bank will forecast, the day before the release.18
17For example, one notes that the reduced sensitivity of near-term interest-rate expectations to
macroeconomic news in 2003, shown in Figure 7, actually begins well in advance of the FOMC's
introduction of explicit forward guidance in August (when it announced that accommodation was
expected to be maintained \for a considerable period"). The timing is more consistent with a view
that market participants (correctly) expected short-term interest rates to be pinned at a low level,
with little room to vary, as concerns about possible deationary risks began to grow.
18There is no direct measure of market expectations of the forecast. As a proxy, the authors use
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Moessner and Nelson estimate a forecasting regression of this kind for values of
n from 1 to 6 quarters in the future, and nd highly signicant positive values of 
for all values between 2 and 6. (The coecient is insignicantly dierent from zero
when n = 1:) However, even when n > 1; the estimated coecients are well below 1:
they range between 0.17 and 0.22. Thus while the Reserve Bank forecasts do seem to
inuence market expectations, market expectations do not simply jump to coincide
perfectly with the Bank's forecast. (This result is consistent with the earlier study of
Archer (2005).) There is, of course, no reason why market forecasts should coincide
perfectly with the Reserve Bank's announcement, given that it is not announcing a
commitment to target those particular rates at those future dates | only a forecast
of what the rates will be, given its current projection of both how the economy is
most likely to evolve and how it will conduct policy as a result. The Reserve Bank's
projections are evidently considered informative, but not dispositive as to what the
optimal forecast must be.
More recently, a number of other central banks (led by the Norges Bank in 2005)
have begun to regularly release forecasts of the future path of their policy rate. The
experience of Sweden's Riksbank, which has published such forecasts since February
2007, is of particular interest, because the Riksbank has also announced on more
than one occasion that its policy rate would remain xed for a specied period of
time | the particular type of forward guidance of greatest relevance to the current
discussion.
In a review of Sweden's experience, Deputy Governor Lars Svensson (2010) argues
that, through December 2008, the Riksbank had been relatively successful at \man-
aging expectations" through its policy. Often, he notes, market expectations were
already fairly close to the announced forward path for the repo rate [the Riksbank's
operating target for the overnight rate19] prior to the announcement, which he regards
as an indication that the bank had succeeded in conducting a predictable policy and
a weighted average of the previous day's futures rate, fn;t 1, and the RBNZ's previous forecast (its
forecast, a quarter earlier, of the 90-day rate n+1 quarters in the future), with the relative weights
on the two proxies determined to maximize the fraction of the variance of the changes in the futures
rate that is explained by the regression.
19It is called \the repo rate" because at one time the bank's policy was implemented through
lending at that rate under repurchase agreements, though this is not currently the case. It now
denes the center of a corridor for the overnight rate, 20 basis points in width, maintained by the
Riksbank.
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in making the systematic character of its policy evident to the public. \When there
were some discrepancies," he writes, \in most cases the market adjusted its expec-
tations towards the [announced] policy-rate path after the announcement" (p. 48).
However, as in the case of New Zealand, this does not mean that market expecta-
tions came to perfectly coincide with the path announced by the Riksbank | only
that the forward curve that could be inferred from futures rates became closer to the
Riksbank's announced path than it had been.
The eects of the Riksbank's more recent experiments with announcements of
an anticipated duration for the current repo rate have been more mixed. On April
21, 2009 (a few hours before the Bank of Canada announcement discussed above),
the Riksbank announced a cut of the repo rate to 50 basis points, together with a
statement that \the repo rate is expected to remain at a low level until the beginning
of 2011," a date nearly two years in the future. The statement was accompanied
by the release of a Monetary Policy Update, with a projected forward path which
showed the repo rate at a constant level of 50 basis points through the end of 2010,
as shown in Figure 9.
The gure shows the actual path of the repo rate as a solid black line (a step
function); the projected forward path from April onward that was published on April
21; the market expected forward path, as inferred by the Riksbank on the basis
of interest-rate forward and swap rates20 the day before the announcement; and
the corresponding market expected forward path after the announcement.21 Market
participants evidently had expected an even larger cut in the repo rate than occurred,
and for the repo rate to remain lower, at least for some months, than was indicated
by the projected path. In response to the announcement, the market expected path
rose, though still remaining lower than the path projected by the Riksbank, for the
rst few months after April. By early 2010, market participants had anticipated that
the repo rate would already be rising above 50 basis points, whereas the Riksbank
projected it to remain at 50 basis points for another year; but in response to the
announcement, the market expected path for 2010 rose still further.
20See Svensson (2010, footnote 7) for more details. The implied forward rates include corrections
for credit risk and maturity premia.
21The gure also shows the Riksbank's previously announced repo-rate path, from February, so






















Figure 9: Market expectations of the forward path of the repo rate in Sweden, before
and after the Riksbank's press release on April 21, 2009 that indicated that the repo
rate was \expected to remain at a low level until the beginning of 2011." Source:
Sveriges Riksbank.
The result is that an announcement that was intended to shift down the antici-
pated forward path of rates, by announcing that a low rate would be maintained until
the beginning of 2011, and so to immediately lower longer-term interest rates, had
exactly the opposite eect: long rates rose, because the entire anticipated forward
path of rates shifted up. What went wrong? While many things happened from one
day to the next | as noted above, the Bank of Canada introduced its own \condi-
tional commitment" six hours after the Riksbank's announcement | it seems clear
that it was the Riksbank's announcement that moved market expectations. Figure
10 shows the intraday OIS rates for Sweden on April 21, with the time of the release
of the Monetary Policy Update shown; the entire term structure of OIS rates moved
up within two hours of the release, and well before any news from North America.
What seems to have happened is that market participants took on board part of
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Figure 10: Intraday Swedish OIS rates on April 21, 2009. The dotted vertical line
indicates the time of the Riksbank's press release (9AM in Sweden, or 3AM EST).
Source: Bloomberg.
the Riksbank's forward guidance, and modied their own forecasts to conform more
with it: the projection of a path that never fell below 50 points convinced many that
(contrary to prior expectations) the Riksbank would not cut the repo rate below that
level. This implied an increase in the projected path for the next two quarters. But
since the news, as far as market participants were concerned, was that the Riksbank
was less inclined toward interest-rate cuts than they had supposed, the entire path
was also shifted up.
In fact, the Riksbank's projected forward path contained two notable features: it
was announced that the repo rate was projected to remain low for nearly two years
into the future, and, quite remarkably relative to prior gures, it was projected to
remain absolutely constant over that time | the only obvious reason for which would
have to have been a decision to treat 50 basis points as the eective lower bound. It
is true that the April Monetary Policy Update contained no announcement that this
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was a lower bound; it even referred to \some probability of further cuts in the future."
But as Svensson (2010) notes, it also emphasized that \the repo rate is now close to its
lower limit," and stated that \with a repo rate at this level, the traditional monetary
policy has largely reached its lower limit." Moreover, immediately after admitting
the possibility in principle of further cuts, it cautioned: \But when the repo rate is
at such low levels, one must consider the fact that this could have negative eects
on the functioning of the nancial markets." It is easy enough to see how market
participants could have read such remarks as indicating an intention by the Riksbank
not to reduce the rate below 50 basis points (at least, under any but exceedingly
dire circumstances). Such an announcement would, of course, be precisely the sort
that should most aect market expectations: because it was interpreted as revealing
something not previously known about the central bank's intentions with regard to
policy, rather than the central bank's judgments about the economic outlook |
and so, a matter about which the bank could undoubtedly be regarded as the most
knowledgeable authority.22
The Riksbank's other message | that it expected not to raise the repo rate before
2011 | evidently made less of an impression. One reason might have been an assump-
tion that this reected the Riksbank's pessimism about the Swedish economy, and
market participants might have been more optimistic, and so expected rate increases
to be justied sooner than the bank anticipated. Svensson (2010) argues instead that
survey data on traders' forecasts of ination and growth indicate that they were no
more optimistic than the Riksbank, and hence that market participants simply did
not accept the Riksbank's forecasts about its own future approach to policy.
Why might this have been? It is notable that a large (and persistent) discrepancy
between the forward paths announced by the Riksbank and those expected by market
participants appeared only when the Riksbank began attempting to use projections of
a policy rate that would remain xed for an unusually long time, as a consequence of
having reached its (self-imposed) lower bound. One may conjecture that the Riksbank
sought, as an alternative to a deeper immediate interest-rate cut, to signal that rates
would be kept low for a longer time than would ordinarily have been expected; and this
supposition about future policy was incorporated into its projections. But this change
in the assumption made about future policy was not credible to market participants,
perhaps because no adequate explanation was given of how policy decisions would be





















Figure 11: Market expectations of the forward path of the repo rate in Sweden, before
and after the Riksbank's press release on July 2, 2009, announcing an additional cut
in the repo rate, and a shortening of the time that the low target was expected to be
maintained. Source: Sveriges Riksbank.
made in the future. The mere fact that the Riksbank announced that it projected
a low path for the repo rate until 2011 was not enough; market participants needed
to have a view of how the Riksbank would make decisions in the future that would
justify such a path (given their expectations regarding the economy's evolution), and
evidently they were not provided with one.
Similar problems of credibility seem to have persisted since then. In July 2009,
the Riksbank announced a further cut in the repo rate, to 25 basis points, but now
only indicated that the target was expected to remain at its low level \until autumn
2010." (This might be considered to vindicate skeptics who had not believed the
April projection of a low rate through the beginning of 2011.) As shown in Figure
11, this announcement did shift down market expectations of the forward path, but





















Figure 12: Market expectations of the forward path of the repo rate in Sweden,
before and after the Riksbank's press release on September 7, 2011, announcing a
\postponement" of further increases in the rate. Source: Sveriges Riksbank.
level past the end of 2009, and expected it to be around 100 basis points by autumn
2010. (In fact, it was only raised to 50 basis points in July 2010 and to 75 basis points
in September.) This apparent failure to credit the Riksbank's view of the length of
time that the target would remain low made policy eectively tighter (in terms of its
consequences for longer-term interest rates and hence for spending decisions) during
2009 than the Riksbank's projection assumed it would be.
Once the Riksbank began tightening policy again, market expectations continued
to diverge from the Riksbank's announced forward paths, but now in the direction of
anticipating a lower future path for the repo rate than the Riksbank. For example,
Figure 12 shows the market expected forward paths before and after the Riksbank's
press release on September 7, 2011. In this release, the Riksbank announced that
the repo rate target would remain at 2.0 percent, rather than continuing to increase
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as it had previously projected,23 owing to deterioration in global growth prospects.
However, this was referred to as only a decision to \postpone continued increases
somewhat"; the new, lower repo rate path continued to show the repo rate steadily
rising over the next three years. Market expectations prior to the announcement
had instead been for cuts in the repo rate to begin by later in the year and to
continue through 2012; and the Riksbank's announcement had very little eect on
those expectations, despite the reiteration of the Riksbank's expectation that the repo
rate would continue on an upward path. In fact, there were no further target increases,
and the timing of the rst two target decreases (in December 2011 and February 2012)
essentially followed the path anticipated by the markets back in September.
Svensson (2011) provides a variety of possible reasons for market expectations of a
lower rate path than the one announced by the Riksbank.24 These are all reasons why
expectations about future economic conditions might plausibly have diered from the
Riksbank's assumptions; for example, he notes that market expectations regarding
the future path of US interest rates indicated lower rates than the path assumed by
the Riksbank in its projections. Under this interpretation, market participants may
have accepted the Riksbank's forecast of how it would behave if conditions evolved as
it assumed, but doubted that those conditions would be realized. But an alternative
possibility is that market participants did not assign much weight to the Riksbank's
assertions about its future intentions.25 If so, it would seem that the attempt to use
forward guidance more aggressively after April 2009 has been associated with a loss
of market condence in the informativeness of the Riksbank's projections. Whether
it will return once macroeconomic conditions have normalized remains to be seen.
23The dashed grey line in the gure shows the repo rate path that had been projected in July,
showing a steady series of small increases continuing into 2014.
24His discussion refers to an earlier stage in the Riksbank's series of repo rate increases in 2010,
when market expectations consistently failed to extrapolate a series of rate increases continuing to
as high a level as the path projected by the Riksbank.
25An awareness of divisions within the Executive Board may have contributed to such skepticism.
Deputy Governors Karolina Ekholm and Lars Svensson have repeatedly dissented from the policy
decisions of the majority, in favor of lower repo-rate paths, since July 2010.
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1.3 What Kind of Forward Guidance Makes Sense?
The above review of recent experience with forward guidance suggests that central-
bank statements about future policy can, at least under some circumstances, aect
nancial markets | and more specically, that they can aect markets in ways that
reect a shift in beliefs about the future path of interest rates toward the one an-
nounced by the central bank. This seems most clearly to have occurred when central
banks that do not ordinarily make statements about policy rates very far in the fu-
ture departed from their usual policy by stating that rates should remain low for an
unusual length of time, owing to having reached their eective lower bound. Perhaps
surprisingly, it is less clear how much inuence on market expectations central banks
have that routinely release detailed projections for the forward path of interest rates.
A possible explanation for this seeming paradox is that forward guidance outside
the context of routine predictions about the future path of interest rates is more of-
ten interpreted as revealing central-bank policy intentions. Information about policy
intentions is likely to aect the expectations of market participants more than infor-
mation about the central bank's view of the economic outlook, because the way in
which the bank intends to conduct policy is a matter about which the bank obviously
knows more than do outsiders, no matter how closely they follow economic news.
And a statement that is viewed as expressing a commitment, that by virtue of its
having been stated should at least to some extent constrain future policy decisions,
should be most informative of all.
The Bank of Canada's \conditional commitment" in April 2009 seems to have been
one of the examples of forward guidance that most clearly changed market expecta-
tions, and this is also the case in which a central bank came closest to committing
itself to a future course of action. The Bank of Canada did not shy away from using
the word \commitment" in its press release, even if this was qualied by the word
\conditional," and the nature of the conditionality was not fully spelled out. Other
central banks, such as the Federal Reserve, have not gone as far; the FOMC's state-
ments have referred only to what the Committee currently anticipates that future
conditions will warrant. Yet even in these cases, observers may well have assumed
that the unusual announcement made sense only if interpreted as a commitment, and
indeed a good deal of commentary interpreted the FOMC's statements this way (and
discussed whether the supposed promise was credible). To the extent that reasons
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are given for a commitment to make sense | as in the case of the Bank of Canada's
explicit reference to its desire to \inuence rates" through \forward guidance" | the
interpretation as a commitment is also more likely.
Releases of central-bank projections of the path of interest rates, in the context of a
more general discussion of the central bank's forecast of the economy's evolution over
the next few years, are less susceptible to interpretation as a commitment, or even
as an expression of a denite intention about future policy that has already been
formed. Apart from the fact that the central banks that use this communication
strategy take pains to emphasize in the accompanying text that their projections for
the policy rate are merely forecasts conditional on current information, the format
in which the projections are presented also makes this evident. But to the extent
that such projections are viewed simply as following from the bank's forecast of the
economy's evolution, including a forecast of the evolution of the policy rate given
how it is typically adjusted in response to varying economic conditions, then they
provide news that should change other market observers' forecasts of the future path
of interest rates only to the extent to which they are thought to reect superior
information about the economic outlook that is available to the central bank. Other
close observers of the economy may or may not believe this is true; and even when
they do believe they can learn something from what the central bank reveals about
its information, their own assessment of the best forecast will in general not put a
weight of 100 percent on the central bank's forecast.
I have remarked above that the degree to which market participants have regarded
the Riksbank's projected repo rate path as informative about the likely future path
of the repo rate more than a few months into the future seems to have decreased
since April 2009, when the target reached a level that the Riksbank was reluctant to
go below, and a statement that the target should remain at that rate for a specic
(fairly long) time was oered instead of a sharper immediate reduction. This may
well have been interpreted as a departure from the bank's previous practice in the
way it produced its projections | but not, evidently, because the bank was now
interpreted as making a commitment that it could be counted upon to fulll.
A possible reason for the reduced credibility of the longer-horizon projections at
this point is that this was the rst occasion on which the announced path reected
a projection of future policy decisions that were history-dependent to any signicant
extent | that is, an assumption about future policy that diered from what one
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would expect that policy to be simply on the basis of conditions at the time. The
reason why it would be desirable for policy to be expected to be history-dependent,
under precisely the circumstances reached by the Riksbank in April 2009, has already
been explained above, in section 1.1: the anticipation at the time of the binding lower
bound of a lower subsequent repo rate than would be desirable on purely forward-
looking grounds at the later date could have benecial (stimulative) eects at the
time of the binding constraint, albeit at the cost of less successful stabilization later.
This may well be the sort of calculation that led the Riksbank to choose a repo rate
path that indicated low rates so far into the future as it did. But in the absence
of any intention to actually make policy decisions in a history-dependent way later
| or at any rate, in the absence of an explanation of the procedures that would be
followed in the future, that made it credible that future policy would be made in that
way | there would be no reason for market expectations about the future conduct
of policy to change.
The Riksbank's ocial description of its approach to monetary policy states that
\in connection with every monetary policy decision, the Executive Board makes an
assessment of the repo-rate path needed for monetary policy to be well-balanced"
(Sveriges Riksbank, 2010, p. 14). The document goes on to explain the competing
considerations that must be taken into account in such an assessment; there is no
suggestion that the exercise is anything but a purely forward-looking consideration,
repeated afresh in each decision cycle, of which of the feasible forward paths for the
economy from that date onward is most desirable, from the standpoint of a criterion
that involves both the rate of ination (and its distance from the ocial ination
target of 2.0 percent) and the level of real activity. Indeed, it stresses that the
appropriate repo-rate path will be reassessed in each decision cycle, so that \the
interest rate path is a forecast, not a promise" (p. 15).
If the model of the economy used in such an assessment of the possible forward
paths at a given point in time incorporates forward-looking private-sector behavior |
as the Riksbank's RAMSES model (Adolfson et al., 2007) certainly does | and if the
model is solved under the assumption that the projected forward path of the policy
rate is anticipated by those forward-looking decisionmakers, then it might easily be
concluded that the most desirable forward path at a given point in time is one which
assumes history-dependent policy later. This is particularly likely to be the case
when the current policy rate is constrained at its lower bound. But in such a case,
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repetition of the forward-looking exercise at the later date will not result in a decision
to continue the interest-rate path previously projected, even if there have been no
surprise developments in the meantime; for a forward-looking assessment of \well-
balanced policy" at the later date will take no account of the eects of expected
policy at that date on decisions expected to be taken in the private-sector earlier,
according to the policy projections made at the earlier date.26
A purely forward-looking forecast-targeting exercise of such a kind would ac-
cordingly be intertemporally inconsistent, as discussed in further detail in Woodford
(2012). This means that there would be no reason for market participants to hold
the expectations assumed in the projection exercise, even if they perfectly understand
the central bank's decision procedure. The problem might be that they understand
it too well | that they have a more accurate forecast of the way that future policy
will be made than the one assumed in the projection exercise.
I do not mean to imply that a time-consistent procedure, that assumes that fu-
ture policy will be determined in a purely forward-looking way, would necessarily be
superior. Such a targeting procedure would be intertemporally consistent, but the
equilibrium implemented will generally be suboptimal, from the standpoint of the
criterion used by the bank itself to rank possible forward paths. In particular, in
a situation of the kind described in section 1.1 above, an inability to commit to a
history-dependent policy would mean acceptance of a low-output trap, and of the
fact that interest-rate policy can accomplish nothing more once the lower bound on
the current overnight rate is reached. What is needed in order to achieve a better
outcome, despite a correct understanding of the determinants of future policy on the
part of market participants, is for the central bank to adopt procedures under which
it will indeed implement a history-dependent policy, and then to make its intentions
clear to market participants. In fact, it does need to oer a \promise," and not merely
a \forecast" | though the required form of promise need not be a commitment to a
specic pre-announced path for the policy rate.
26In discussing this pitfall of a forecast-targeting approach to monetary policy, I do not mean
to assert that the approach described is necessarily that of Riksbank. At least some members of
the Riksbank's Executive Board clearly understand the analytical point made here, and approaches
to forecast targeting that would institutionalize history-dependence are discussed, for example, in
Svensson and Woodford (2005) and Svensson (2005). It is not clear, however, that current Riksbank
policy institutionalizes history-dependence of this sort, and still less that market participants have
been given a reason to expect this.
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These comments should also not be taken to suggest that the form of forward
guidance recently practiced instead by the Federal Reserve represents an ideal model.
While the FOMC's forward guidance has often been interpreted as making a commit-
ment to keep the funds rate low for a specied period of time, in fact its communica-
tion about future policy | both through its post-meeting press releases and through
the information about individual participants' forecasts of the funds rate path in the
quarterly Survey of Economic Projections | has taken only the form of predictions
about the future path of the funds rate, given what can be known at present.
In particular, no indication of a decision to change the FOMC's policy rule is ever
given; it is thus always possible to interpret the FOMC's announcements about future
policy as simply reecting changes in the FOMC's view of likely future economic
conditions, and hence the path of the funds rate that can be expected under their
normal reaction function. For example, when the FOMC announced in January 2012
that \the Committee ... currently anticipates that economic conditions ... are likely
to warrant exceptionally low levels for the federal funds rate at least through late
2014," the headline of the New York Times online story about the announcement
was \Fed Signals That a Full Recovery Is Years Away." While the shift in the OIS
yield curve indicates that market forecasts of the funds rate several years in the
future fell after the announcement, as shown above, this might have been a response
to expectations of a slower recovery rather than to any understanding that FOMC
policy had changed.27
Some will undoubtedly protest that a reference to the bank's current forecasts
is the only prudent form of forward guidance for a central bank to oer. If one
supposes that the only alternative would have been for the FOMC to oer an explicit
promise to keep the funds rate target at 0-25 basis points until late in 2014, then one
might well think so; a non-state-contingent commitment extending three years into
the future would surely have been unwise. The resort to a mere prediction might
seem a clever way of allowing for state-contingency without having to explain all of
the possible contingencies; we are saying what the path of the funds rate will be if
27The Fed itself took some pains to deny that it was attempting to use forward guidance as a
tool of policy at all. Unlike the Bank of Canada, which explained its \conditional commitment" as
an attempt to \provide more explicit guidance" in order to \inuence rates," Chairman Bernanke
was quoted as saying during the press conference following the release of the FOMC's statement, \I
wouldn't overstate the Fed's ability to massively change expectations through its statements" (New
York Times, 2012).
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things develop in the way that can be anticipated given what we now know, but we
make it clear that this is only our current anticipation | policy may have to be
dierent if unexpected developments arise.
It is certainly right that a desirable form of forward guidance | if it involves
communication about anything but a fairly short horizon | would not make un-
conditional promises about the future path of the funds rate. Since Campbell et
al. (2012) refer to the \late 2014" statement language as implementing \the pol-
icy recommendations of Eggertsson and Woodford (2003)," I should point out that
Eggertsson and Woodford (2003) do not argue for the desirability of a commitment
to keep the policy rate at zero for a xed period of time. We argue for the desir-
ability of a commitment to conduct policy in a dierent way than a discretionary
central banker would wish to, ex post, and show that (in our New Keynesian model)
the optimal commitment involves keeping the policy rate at zero for some time after
the point at which a forward-looking ination-targeting bank (or a bank following a
forward-looking \Taylor Rule") would begin to raise interest rates. But the date T
until which the policy rate should be kept at zero is not a date that can be announced
with certainty at the time of the shock that causes the zero lower bound to bind; its
optimal value depends on how the economy develops. (In the paper, we illustrate
numerically how it should depend on the length of time for which the natural rate
of interest remains abnormally low; and we give a more general analytical character-
ization of the optimal policy commitment that implies that T should depend on the
evolution of cost-push disturbances as well.)
But this does not mean that mere communication of the forward path that the
central bank currently forecasts is all that is likely to be useful. Unfortunately, such
an approach has a serious aw, which is precisely that a given statement about the
change in the anticipated forward path of the policy rate may be subject to multiple
interpretations. If an announcement that the date T at which the policy rate will
rst rise above its lower bound has moved farther into the future is interpreted as
meaning that the rst date at which a standard (purely forward-looking) Taylor Rule
would require a policy rate above the oor has moved farther into the future (because
of a weakening of the economic outlook) | without in any way challenging the
expectation that the bank will, as always, follow such a rule | then the announcement
(if also believed) should have a contractionary eect on aggregate demand, rather
than an expansionary one. For rather than implying that, at a certain point in the
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future, interest rates will be held lower than one would have expected prior to the
announcement (so that real incomes at that time will be greater than would previously
have been expected, and likely ination as well), the announcement would instead
imply that real incomes at that time will be lower than would previously have been
expected (and likely ination as well) | which change in anticipations should reduce
current willingness to spend rather than increasing it. \Forward guidance" of this
kind would have a perverse eect, and be worse that not commenting on the outlook
for future interest rates at all.
The only way to avoid this pitfall is to accompany any discussion of the forward
path of interest rates with an explanation of the considerations behind it | in partic-
ular, of the policy commitments that the anticipated forward path reects. Discussion
of the forward path of interest rates implied by a central bank's policy commitments
may well be useful, for the reasons discussed above in section 1.1. But this does not
mean that presentation of the implied forward path for interest rates suces as an
explanation of the bank's policy commitments.
1.3.1 Which Criterion for \Lift-O" from the Lower Bound?
In the case of a central bank at the lower bound for its policy rate, it is important
to discuss what will determine the date T at which \lift-o" from the oor should
occur, and not simply the bank's current estimate (or range of estimates) of that date.
Eggertsson and Woodford (2003) show that, in the context of their New Keynesian
DSGE model, an optimal policy commitment can be expressed in terms of a com-
mitment to maintain interest rates at their oor until a particular target is achieved.
(After that, the bank should be expected to implement the kind of \exible ination
targeting" regime characterized in studies of optimal monetary policy that abstract
from the existence of a lower bound on interest rates.) The target species a path
for an \output-gap adjusted" price level, (the log of) which is dened as the log of a
general price index plus a positive multiple of the output gap; the coecient multi-
plying the output gap in the optimal target criterion depends on the relative weight
on output-gap stabilization (as opposed to ination stabilization) in the bank's ob-
jective. The policy rate should remain at its lower bound as long as even that degree
of monetary stimulus results in a gap-adjusted price level below the target path. This
means that even once nancial conditions have normalized, so that it would be pos-
sible for the central bank to achieve both its ination target and a zero output gap
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from then onward (at a normal level of the policy rate), it might be necessary to keep
interest rates low for somewhat longer, in order to raise the gap-adjusted price level
to the target path.
Under a fully optimal policy commitment, the target path for the gap-adjusted
price level would not be deterministic (and so able to be xed at the time of the shock
that initially causes the lower bound to bind); instead, the target would be ratcheted
up to a steadily higher level, the longer the target shortfalls required by the lower
bound persist. Eggertsson and Woodford (2003) provide an explicit formula for the
optimal adjustment, and show that it is independent of the nature of the shocks
that hit the economy; the adjustment each period depends only on the degree of
shortfall of the actual gap-adjusted price level from the current target level. As a
consequence, the existence of such adjustments need not undermine the veriability
of a central bank's commitment to such a rule. Nonetheless, the adjustment formula
would certainly complicate explanation of such a commitment to the public, and the
numerical simulations presented by Eggertsson and Woodford suggest that nearly as
good a stabilization outcome should be achieved under credible commitment to a
much simpler criterion: one in which the target for the gap-adjusted price level grows
at a deterministic rate, given by the bank's long-run ination target.28 The gains
from credible forward guidance depend mainly upon not letting the target path shift
down in response to persistent target shortfalls during the period of the binding lower
bound; the potential gains from actually shifting the path up in response to target
shortfalls represent a comparatively minor renement.29
28In the analysis of Eggertsson and Woodford (2003), the long-run ination target is assumed to
be zero, so the simple rule that is analyzed is one in which the target for the gap-adjusted price level
is constant, rather than growing at a constant rate; but all of the paper's results directly generalize
to the case of a long-run ination target dierent from zero.
29Levin et al. (2010) consider the issue under dierent numerical assumptions, and conclude that
a constant gap-adjusted price level target would not be as close an approximation to fully optimal
policy as in the results of Eggertsson and Woodford; in the case considered by these authors, the
degree to which it would be optimal to ratchet up the price-level target during the period of the
binding lower bound is greater. Nonetheless, the results of Levin et al. again indicate that a credible
commitment to an adjusted price-level target would substantially improve upon the equilibrium that
results from an inability to commit to any history-dependent policy. These authors stress that, under
their numerical assumptions, the outcomes achievable through forward guidance are still signicantly
worse than what would be possible if the lower bound could be circumvented; hence they argue for
the desirability of seeking to use additional instruments as well. Their work does not, however, show
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A commitment not to let the target path shift down means that, to the extent
that the target path is undershot during the period of a binding lower bound for the
policy rate, this automatically justies anticipation of a (temporarily) more expan-
sionary policy later, which anticipation should reduce the incentives for price cuts and
spending cutbacks earlier, and so should tend to limit the degree of the undershoot-
ing. Such a commitment also avoids some of the common objections to the simple
Krugman (1998) proposal that the central bank target a higher rate of ination when
the zero lower bound constrains policy.
For example, many central bankers are reluctant to consider announcing a higher
ination target on the ground that, while policy is constrained by the lower bound
on interest rates, they may have no means by which to hit such a target; and they
fear that announcing a target that they do not then achieve will only damage the
credibility of any future announcements about their purported policy targets. But
the proposal of Eggertsson and Woodford (2003) is not to commit to a target that
one pretends can be hit over the next six months, or indeed over any pre-specied
horizon; the role of the target is instead to specify how one can tell how far o
track one has gotten, whether extremely low interest rates continue to be justied,
and whether they are likely to continue to be justied for some time. The facts
that the target is specied in terms of the level of a nominal quantity, rather than
its rate of change, and that conformity with the target is measured in a backward-
looking way (tracking the cumulative departure from the target path) rather than
purely prospectively, both make the target meaningful as a commitment without an
expectation that the target represents the intended actual outcome over some short
horizon. Hence the announcement of such a target, if properly explained, should
create no issues of credibility | assuming, that is, that the central bank means what
it says, and does continue to refer to the target path in its decision process going
forward.
Many central bankers also resist the advice to announce an ad hoc modication
of their normal ination target, even when constrained by the zero lower bound, for
fear that market participants who see that the ination target can be shifted on this
occasion will thereafter wonder whether it cannot equally be shifted in many other
circumstances as well, resulting in a loss of the benets during normal times of well-
that the eects of forward guidance alone would be insignicant.
42
anchored medium-run ination expectations.30 This is an understandable concern.
But the \target path" proposal of Eggertsson and Woodford does not represent an-
nouncement of a new criterion for appropriate monetary policy that contradicts the
way in which the central bank would have wanted people to expect it to act, prior
to the disturbance that causes the lower bound to bind; for the proposed target path
for the gap-adjusted price level is precisely the one that it would have been desirable
for the central bank to commit to maintain, even in the absence of any expectation
that the lower bound would prevent achievement of the target for a time. Thus it
would have been possible (and according to the model, desirable) for a central bank
to commit to an approach to monetary policy, prior to the occurrence of such a crisis,
in which the behavior in question after the lower bound is reached would be precisely
what the central bank had previously committed to do.
Moreover (and more to the point, under present circumstances), even in the ab-
sence of a such a prior commitment, it should be possible for a central bank to argue
that a commitment to return to the target path, made explicit only after the lower
bound becomes a binding constraint, is nonetheless consistent with the policy com-
mitments that had shaped its policy previously | the proviso about what those
commitments required in the event of a binding lower bound on interest rates (and
consequent persistent undershooting of the target path) had simply never needed to
be spelled out until such a situation arose.31 The same could not be said of a series
of hypothetical future \temporary suspensions" of the ination target each time un-
employment was higher than desired. Hence adoption of a commitment to reation
during a period at the interest-rate lower bound, if properly explained, need not raise
fears that excuses for continuing high ination will easily be found.
Despite these conceptual advantages, one must admit that the notion of a target
for a \gap-adjusted price level" would not easily be made to seem natural to a public
not previously accustomed to discussion of economic policy in such terms. The fact
30For examples of expression of this concern by Federal Reserve ocials, see Kohn (2009) and
Bernanke (2010).
31More technically, the adoption of such a policy commitment, even if ad hoc in the sense of only
being introduced once the central bank nds itself in unexpected circumstances, is not an example
of disregard for prior expectations of the kind that occurs under a purely discretionary approach
to the conduct of policy, if the commitment is chosen to be optimal \from a timeless perspective"
(as the Eggertsson-Woodford rule is). See Woodford (2011) for further discussion of the selection of
policy commitments from a timeless perspective.
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that the \output-gap adjustment" would require reference to a debatable measure
of potential output would further increase the possible grounds for suspicion and
uncertainty about the policy's implications. There might then be practical advantages
to the formulation of one's target criterion in terms more familiar to the public, and
more easily veriable, even at the expense of some departure from the theoretically
optimal criterion under idealized assumptions about the public's understanding.
An example of a target criterion that has received considerable attention within
the Federal Reserve System is the \7/3 threshold rule" proposed by President Charles
Evans of the Chicago Fed (Evans, 2011) and analyzed in Campbell et al. (2012).
Under this proposal the FOMC would pledge to maintain the funds rate target at its
current low level as long as unemployment remains above 7 percent and the expected
rate of ination \over the medium term" remains below 3 percent per year, but would
begin to raise the funds rate as soon as either threshold were breached. Adoption of
such a commitment by the FOMC would be an important improvement upon current
communication policy, in my view. It would emphasize the conditions for exit from
the current extremely accommodative policy stance, rather than a date. And the
stated conditions would involve both parts of the Fed's dual legislative mandate,
as in the case of the optimal criterion derived by Eggertsson and Woodford (2003).
Reference to the unemployment rate might be considered a proxy for the theoretical
concept of the output gap, and while it is not necessarily an ideal measure it has the
advantages of being much better understood by the public, being widely recognized
as a relevant measure of economic performance, and of not being a measure that the
Fed itself must construct and might therefore be thought to manipulate.
Nonetheless, the Evans proposal fails to incorporate an important feature of the
optimal policy commitment in the model of Eggertsson and Woodford, which also
characterizes optimal commitments in more general (and more realistic) New Keyne-
sian models (for reasons discussed in Woodford, 2011): the commitment to compen-
sate subsequently for target misses due to the binding zero lower bound on interest-
rate policy. Like a simple Taylor rule, the \7/3 threshold rule" is an example of a
purely forward-looking criterion for policy: the appropriate policy at any time de-
pends only on the paths for ination and unemployment that can be achieved from
that time onward, independently of the path by which the economy may have reached
its current state. In the context of the simple macroeconomic model considered by
Eggertsson and Woodford (where ination and output determination are also purely
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forward-looking), such a rule will not imply any reason to delay immediately return-
ing to the low-ination steady state as soon as this is consistent with the zero lower
bound on interest rates (i.e., as soon as the natural rate of interest returns to positive
territory); it would not imply any commitment to keep the policy rate low for longer
than would a strict ination target or a purely contemporaneous Taylor rule. This
means that a credible commitment to such a rule would do nothing to mitigate the
problems created by the zero lower bound in the model of Eggertsson and Woodford.
In a model with more complex dynamics, such a commitment is not necessarily
irrelevant. But the fact that it is a purely forward-looking criterion, that simply
takes a temporarily dierent form than one that the central bank would be willing to
follow under normal conditions, means that it must necessarily appear as an ad hoc
departure, both from the policy that the bank had been expected to follow (and that
it would have wanted to be expected to follow) prior to the crisis, and from the policy
that it will again want the public to expect it to follow later. Adoption of such an
arbitrary criterion, presented simply as a temporary suspension of the principles that
ordinarily are expected to guide policy, would inevitably tend to reduce the credibility
of the bank's commitment to those principles at other times.
An alternative that I believe should be equally easy to explain to the general pub-
lic, but that would preserve more of the advantages of the adjusted price-level target
path, would be a criterion based on a nominal GDP target path, as proposed by
Hatsius and Stehn (2011), Romer (2011), and Sumner (2011) among others. Under
this proposal, the FOMC would pledge to maintain the funds rate target at its lower
bound as long as nominal GDP remains below a deterministic target path, represent-
ing the path that the FOMC would have kept it on (or near) if the interest-rate lower
bound had not constrained policy since late 2008. Once nominal GDP again reaches
the level of this path, it will be appropriate to raise nominal interest rates, to the
level necessary to maintain a steady growth rate of nominal GDP thereafter.
Figure 13 shows the recent evolution of US nominal GDP, with a log-linear trend
line t to the data between 1990:Q1 and 2008:Q3 (i.e., the last quarter before the zero
lower bound became a binding constraint).32 Nominal GDP is currently well below
this trend line (15.6 percentage points below, as of 2012:Q2), and the gap continues
to increase. Even if one regarded the average rate of nominal GDP growth over this
32Most of the period to which the trend line is t is not shown in the gure, in order to highlight
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Figure 13: US nominal GDP growth compared to a log-linear trend line t to the
data between 1990:Q1 and 2008:Q3. Source: Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.
period as too high to be consistent with a desirable ination rate over a longer run,
and had chosen instead to commit to a trend line with a moderately lower growth
rate (say, only 4.5 percent per year), one would still conclude that nominal GDP
today is more than 10 percentage points below a trend line extrapolated forward
from 2008:Q3;33 such a commitment would accordingly require pursuit of nominal
GDP growth well above the intended long-run trend rate for a few years in order
to close this gap. At the same time, such a commitment would clearly bound the
amount of excess nominal income growth that would be allowed, at a level consistent
with the Fed's announced long-runt target for ination.
In the theoretical analysis of Eggertsson and Woodford (2003), a simple nominal
GDP target path would not achieve quite the full welfare gains associated with a
credible commitment to the gap-adjusted price level target. (In particular, it is
33See, for example, the calculations of Hatsius and Stehn (2011), who extrapolate forward from
2007:Q4.
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surely true | and not just in the special model of Eggertsson and Woodford | that
if consensus could be reached about the path of potential output, it would be desirable
in principle to adjust the target path for nominal GDP to account for variations over
time in the growth of potential.) Nonetheless, such a proposal would retain several
of the desirable characteristics of the gap-adjusted price level target that have been
stressed above, and these may well be the most robustly desirable features of that
proposal.
Essentially, the nominal GDP target path represents a compromise between the
aspiration to choose a target that would achieve an ideal equilibrium if correctly
understood and the need to pick a target that can be widely understood and can be
implemented in a way that allows for verication of the central bank's pursuit of its
alleged target, in the spirit of Milton Friedman's celebrated proposal of a constant
growth rate for a monetary aggregate. Indeed, it can be viewed as a modern version
of Friedman's \k-percent rule" proposal, in which the variable that Friedman actually
cared about stabilizing (the growth rate of nominal income34) replaces the monetary
aggregate that he proposed as a better proximate target, on the ground that the Fed
had much more direct control over the money supply. On the one hand, the Fed's
ability to directly control broad monetary aggregates (the ones more directly related
to nominal income in the way that Friedman assumed) can no longer be taken for
granted, under current conditions; and on the other hand, modern methods of forecast
targeting make a commitment to the pursuit of a target dened in terms of variables
that are not under the short-run control of the central bank more credible. Under
these circumstances, a case can be made that a nominal GDP target path would
remain true to Friedman's fundamental concerns.35
Would there be any role for releases of central-bank projections of the economy's
likely future path under such an approach to forward guidance? Yes. I have argued
that merely releasing projections (including projections of the expected path of the
34On the consistency of nominal income stabilization with the positions of Friedman and other
monetarist authors, see for example McCallum and Nelson (1998), especially their footnote 4.
35See, for example, Beckworth (2011) for an argument to this eect. Beckworth notes that Fried-
man (2003) praised the accuracy of \the Fed's thermostat," for having reduced M2 growth during
the period of increasing \velocity" in 1988-1997, and then increased M2 growth by several percent-
age points during a period of decreasing velocity in 1997-2003. One might conclude that Friedman
valued successful stabilization of nominal GDP growth more than strict delity to a \k-percent
rule."
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policy rate), without clarifying the target criterion that is assumed to shape future
policy deliberations | or referring only to purely forward-looking criteria, that do
not incorporate the kind of commitment to correction of target misses that a nominal
GDP target path would imply | accomplishes little. But the success of the kind
of forward guidance proposed here, based on commitment to a history-dependent
target criterion as the basis for future policy, depends both on people's being able to
understand now the future consequences of such a commitment, and on the credibility
of the purported commitment on the part of the central bank. Both would be greatly
facilitated by the adoption of a transparent forecast-targeting procedure as the basis
for monetary policy deliberations and for communication with the public about the
outcome of those deliberations.
2 Expanding the Supply of Bank Reserves
Much of the discussion of the possibilities for expansionary policy since the major
central banks reached their interest-rate lower bounds around the end of 2008 has
focused on the use of changes in the central bank's balance sheet | its overall size,
the composition of its assets, and the share of its liabilities that are \monetary"
in character | as additional dimensions of policy, apart from the central bank's
inuence over overnight money-market rates. Sometimes these additional dimensions
of policy are proposed as measures that can usefully support a central bank's forward
guidance, by allowing it to take concrete actions that may be viewed as underlining
its intentions with regard to future interest-rate policy, instead of relying purely upon
speech.
For others, they represent additional tools that should be used alongside for-
ward guidance, given that, even under ideal circumstances (when the central bank's
representations about future policy are fully believed and their consequences fully
understood), forward guidance alone cannot be expected to completely eliminate the
distortions resulting from the interest-rate lower bound. To the extent that other
means are regarded as having similar eects as a current reduction in short-term
interest rates, it should still be useful to use such tools.
For yet others, they represent tools that should make forward guidance unneces-
sary. After all, in the model of Eggertsson and Woodford (2003), if a sucient re-
duction in the current short-term interest rate were possible at all times, there would
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be no need for any commitment to history-dependent policy at all; so if balance-
sheet policies can achieve the same outcome as an interest-rate cut without violating
the lower bound, they should eliminate the need for any awkward public statements
about future policy.
But what can one reasonably expect adjustments of the central bank's balance
sheet to achieve? Can such policies properly be viewed as the equivalent of interest-
rate reductions, achieved by other means? And if they are eective, do they therefore
eliminate the need for explicit forward guidance?
In this section, I consider one particular type of balance-sheet policies, namely
those aimed at expanding the monetary liabilities of the central bank (the monetary
base), in practice by expanding the supply of bank reserves, either through extensions
of central-bank credit or asset purchases of one kind or another. The implications of
central bank purchases of particular types of assets (regardless of how this may be
nanced), and of changes in the composition (as opposed to the size) of the asset side
of the balance sheet are deferred until section 3.
2.1 Pure Quantitative Easing in Theory
The best-known doctrine according to which balance-sheet policies should remain
eective at the interest-rate lower bound is the theory of \quantitative easing," put
into practice by the Bank of Japan in the period 2001-2006 (which originated the
term). (Here I call this \pure quantitative easing," to distinguish the original theory
of quantitative easing from the way the term has come to be used in the press, to
refer to a much broader class of policies and possible mechanisms.36)
According to this theory, increases in the monetary base | which continue to
be possible, and are completely under the control of the central bank, regardless of
the level of overnight interest rates | should stimulate increased aggregate nominal
expenditure, regardless of whether overnight interest rates change. The theory was
urged upon the Bank of Japan by outside critics after it had reduced its target
for the call rate (the overnight interest rate which had been the BOJ's policy rate)
36Shiratsuka (2009) and Ueda (2012b) dene \pure quantitative easing" in the way that the term
is used here, though both point out that the actual unconventional policies of the BOJ during the
2001-2006 period included other elements, in addition to the ones that they would classify as pure
QE. Ueda (2012a) simply calls this kind of policy \quantitative easing," distinguishing QE from
\targeted asset purchases."
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essentially to zero, but prices continued to fall while economic activity remained
sluggish. For example, at a conference in 2000, Milton Friedman responded (as quoted
by Beckworth, 2011) to the suggestion that the possibilities for further monetary
expansion had been exhausted:
Now, the Bank of Japan's argument is, \Oh well, we've got the interest
rate down to zero; what more can we do?"
It's very simple. They can buy long-term government securities, and
they can keep buying them and providing high-powered money until
the high-powered money starts getting the economy in an expansion.
Thus Friedman argued that a further increase in the monetary base [which he calls
\high-powered money"] would necessarily increase spending, and so end the dea-
tionary slump.37
According to classic monetarist doctrine, what matters is the expansion of the
central bank's monetary liabilities, and not the nature of the assets acquired with the
newly created base money; hence it is most prudent (and involves the least unneces-
sary interference with market mechanisms) if the central bank restricts its purchases
to safe government securities. What matters is the deliberate expansion of the mon-
etary base to the extent necessary to support the desired level of aggregate nominal
expenditure. The BOJ followed this advice in its policy of \quantitative easing,"
under which it announced a series of progressively higher numerical targets for the
current account balance (i.e., the supply of bank reserves), beginning in March 2001,
and undertook asset purchases (mainly of Japanese Government Bonds) so as to im-
plement these targets. The resulting large increase in current account balances, and
the consequent increase in the Japanese monetary base, are shown in Figure 14 below.
But while it is undeniable that a central bank can still further increase the mone-
tary base after the supply of bank reserves is already great enough to drive short-term
interest rates down to the level of the rate of interest paid on reserves (or to zero, if
there is no interest on reserves), it is hardly obvious that this should have any eect
on aggregate nominal expenditure. The doctrine that Friedman assumes in his advice
37After the BOJ began its \quantitative easing" policy, Friedman praised the action, on the ground
that \the Japanese central bank has nally started ... buying long-term government securities and
increasing high-powered money" (UPI, 2001). On Friedman's support for quantitative easing, see
further Nelson (2012).
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to have been well-established empirically is one according to which an increase in the
monetary base necessarily increases a broader monetary aggregate (M1 or M2), in
proportion to the increase in base money if the \money multiplier" remains stable;
and the increase in broad money necessarily increases aggregate nominal expenditure,
in proportion to the increase in money if the \velocity of money" remains stable. The
economic mechanism behind the causal chain is one according to which there should
be a nite demand for real base money, proportional to the real volume of transac-
tions in the economy, and a decreasing function of the opportunity cost of holding
base money.38 If the nominal size of the monetary base increases, one or more of
these determinants of desired holdings must also change, to maintain equilibrium: a
decline in the interest dierential between short-term non-monetary assets and bank
reserves (to reduce the opportunity cost of holding reserves, and so increase demand
for reserves); an increase in the real volume of transactions (which should propor-
tionally increase the demand for real balances); or an increase in the price level (so
that the real monetary base does not increase by as large a proportion as the nominal
increase).
These familiar mechanisms may have resulted in a fairly reliable connection be-
tween expansions of the monetary base and increases in aggregate nominal expen-
diture under ordinary circumstances | under which a substantial opportunity cost
of holding excess reserves exists | but there is no reason to expect them to work
in the same way once the opportunity cost is eliminated, because money-market in-
terest rates are no longer higher than the interest rate paid on reserves. It should
not be possible for the rate of interest at which banks are willing to hold short-term
non-monetary instruments to be no larger than the interest rate on reserves, unless
reserves have ceased to be scarce, so that they no longer earn a \liquidity premium"
owing to their special role in the payments system. And under the latter circum-
stance, the demand for reserves should become innitely elastic, so that variations
in the precise quantity of excess reserves (as opposed to other short-term, essentially
riskless assets) that banks must hold will have no consequences for equilibrium deter-
mination. Indeed, it is this very fact that the demand for reserves becomes innitely
elastic at an opportunity cost of zero that explains why there is a lower bound on
38In a complete exposition, one should distinguish between the demand for currency and the
demand for bank reserves. The present discussion has mainly to do only with the demand for bank
reserves, since policies like the BOJ's QE policy have little eect on the supply of currency.
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how low money-market interest rates can be driven through variation in the supply of
reserves. The same mechanism implies that once that lower bound is reached, further
expansion of the supply of reserves should not have any consequences for aggregate
expenditure or the general level of prices (or for that matter, for broad monetary
aggregates).39
Monetarist authors often assert that the Keynesian notion of a \liquidity trap"
depends on an overly narrow conception of the monetary transmission mechanism,
in which it is assumed that monetary policy can only inuence spending through its
eects on a short-term nominal interest rate, so that if that rate can no longer fall
(owing to the zero lower bound) monetary policy must be impotent. To this mon-
etarists reply that there are many other asset prices (including longer-term interest
rates) that can still move in ways that would provide incentives for increased expen-
diture, even when the short-term nominal interest rate remains xed; and that an
excess supply of money will surely aect these other rates even if it can no longer de-
crease the short-term nominal interest rate. But this sort of reasoning treats the zero
lower bound as if it were some additional institutional constraint (like the practice of
not auctioning Treasury bills in a way that would allow the yield to be negative), and
not a consequence of the demand for bank reserves. Because the demand for reserves
becomes unbounded once the opportunity cost falls to zero, there is no \disequilib-
rium" that requires some other asset price to adjust in order to restore the balance of
supply and demand for reserves. There is accordingly no reason for the equilibrium
values of other asset prices to change, whether or not these other asset prices are also
arguments of the demand for base money, and whether or not they are important
determinants of aggregate expenditure.
It may be objected that the argument just given establishes only that once the
interest-rate lower bound is reached, bank reserves and other very short-term riskless
claims should become essentially perfect substitutes, so that increases in reserves that
come about through central-bank purchases of riskless short-term assets | the sort
of transactions that represented the preferred means of increasing or decreasing the
supply of reserves under the \Bills Only" doctrine of the Federal Reserve System
39The logic of equilibrium determination in such a \liquidity trap" is displayed in a simple two-
period analysis by Krugman (1998), and expounded in the context of a complete intertemporal
general equilibrium model by Eggertsson and Woodford (2003).
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(Luckett, 1960) | should have no eect. But this does not imply that the creation of
reserves in order to purchase longer-term (or risky) assets should have no eect, and
indeed it may be noticed that in the quotation above, Friedman refers to purchases
of \long-term government securities." Might QE not be eective as long as long-term
government bonds are purchased?
The argument given above does not suce to answer this question (which is
considered further in the next section). However, I would maintain that such a policy
does not constitute \quantitative easing" in the pure sense. A policy of creating
additional reserves in order to purchase long-term Treasury securities can equivalently
be analyzed as the composition of two policies: one under which new reserves are
created by purchasing short-term Treasuries (\pure QE"), and another under which
the central bank sells short-term Treasuries to buy long-term Treasury securities,
with no change in the size of its balance sheet (\Operation Twist"). To the extent
that a reserve-nanced purchase of long-term Treasuries has eects at the zero lower
bound, on the price of Treasuries or anything else, these eects should be identical
to the eects of \Operation Twist" alone.
It does not make sense, in my view, to consider such a policy a variety of \quan-
titative easing." To the extent that it is eective, the mechanisms involved must be
quite distinct from those invoked in the classic theory of quantitative easing, and have
nothing to do with the supply of or demand for monetary liabilities of the central
bank. (They instead involve only the asset side of the central bank's balance sheet.)
And, while such policies are among the actions that can be taken by a central bank,
it is not obvious that they are properly considered as part of monetary policy. They
belong to the sphere of debt management, and to be eective, should at the very
least be coordinated with the Treasury, since it is the net change in the supply of
securities of various types in the hands of the public that should matter, whether
brought about through transactions by the Treasury or by the central bank. Some
monetarists, such as Congdon (2011), argue that it would be best for such operations
to be conducted entirely by the Treasury, in order to avoid the risk of accounting
losses by the central bank. While I do not exclude such policies from consideration
here, it makes sense to treat them as analytically distinct from pure QE policies.
Finally, some would argue that the well-established principle of the long-run neu-
trality of money implies that an expansion of the monetary base must eventually
result in a proportional increase in the general level of prices (though with no real
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eects, in that long run), and hence must eventually be able to increase aggregate
nominal expenditure, to whatever extent may be desired. But this argument concerns
the eects of a policy of permanently increasing the monetary base. The \irrelevance
results" of Krugman (1998) and Eggertsson and Woodford (2003) instead pertain to
a policy that increases the monetary base only during a period over which the zero
lower bound prevents the central bank from achieving its usual targets, while the
central bank is expected to return to its usual (purely forward-looking) approach to
policy once it is no longer constrained | for example, by returning to the pursuit
of its long-run ination target, or by following a Taylor rule consistent with such a
target. Policies of the kind assumed in these thought experiments do not imply that
the increase in base money resulting from the QE policy will be permanent; eventu-
ally the lower bound ceases to be a binding constraint, and after that, the path of
the monetary base is the one required by the ination target or by the Taylor rule,
independent of the amount of quantitative easing that has occurred previously.
If, instead, one were to assume a permanent increase in the size of the monetary
base, and assume that it is immediately understood by everyone in the economy that
such a permanent change in policy has occurred, then such a policy would be predicted
to have an immediate positive eect on economic activity during the period in which
the lower bound binds, in either the model of Krugman (1998) or Eggertsson and
Woodford (2003). Indeed, this explains the apparently dierent result of Auerbach
and Obstfeld, 2005. These authors assume an initial policy dened by a deterministic
path for the monetary base, in a situation in which a disturbance causes short-term
nominal interest rates under this policy to fall to zero for a nite period of time, and
then consider an alternative policy under which a permanently higher path for the
monetary base is chosen; they nd that even though the nominal interest rate is zero
at the time of the increase in the monetary base, the change immediately increases
both real activity and prices. The irrelevance result of Eggertsson and Woodford
actually applies equally to the model of Auerbach and Obstfeld; the policy considered
by Auerbach and Obstfeld is eective because in addition to the immediate increase
in the monetary base, it also involves a commitment to a dierent policy after the
zero lower bound ceases to bind | at which time it implies not just a dierent path
for the monetary base, but dierent interest-rate policy as well.
In fact, the eects of the policy proposed by Auerbach and Obstfeld follow entirely
from the commitment to a dierent policy later; the eects would be the same if there
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were no open-market purchases of assets at all, until the end of the period in which
the short-term nominal interest rate is zero under the original policy (i.e., the period
in which there is already an excess supply of base money, relative to what is needed to
keep the interest rate at zero). Moreover, these expansionary eects during the period
of the \liquidity trap" depend entirely on the change in future policy already being
able to be foreseen. The model is thus another example of the gains that are possible,
in principle, through a commitment to more expansionary policy in the future.
Indeed, it is an example closely related to the proposal of commitment to a nomi-
nal GDP target path, discussed above. The model of Auerbach and Obstfeld assumes
a cash-in-advance constraint, as a result of which the demand for base money is equal
to aggregate nominal expenditure each period, except when the nominal interest rate
falls to zero (in which case households are willing to hold any quantity of base money
at least equal to their planned nominal spending). Hence the commitment to a deter-
ministic path for the monetary base is equivalent to a commitment to a deterministic
target path for aggregate nominal expenditure, together with a commitment to use
monetary policy to keep nominal expenditure equal to the target at all times, un-
less expenditure undershoots the target even when the money supply is already large
enough to drive the nominal interest rate to zero. The demonstration by Auerbach
and Obstfeld that welfare can be increased by permanently increasing the supply of
base money could alternatively be used to show that welfare could be increased by
committing to keep the nominal interest rate at zero until it is possible to hit a certain
deterministic target path for nominal GDP, and then use monetary policy to keep
nominal GDP growing at a steady rate thereafter. The inferior initial equilibrium is
instead one in which nominal GDP is allowed to follow a permanently lower path,
albeit with the same long-run growth rate.
Might one nonetheless conclude from the Auerbach and Obstfeld example that
money-nanced asset purchases (as they describe the policy that they analyze) can
be an eective substitute for forward guidance? No, for the eects that they analyze
occur only under the assumption that the implications for the long-run path of base
money are immediately apparent to everyone as a result of the policy change. One can
only maintain that such eects would occur even in the absence of explicit forward
guidance | an announcement of the central bank's commitment to a dierent kind of
future monetary policy than had previously been expected | if one supposes that the
mere fact of the current expansion of the monetary base would give people a reason
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to anticipate a correspondingly higher long-run monetary base, without a need for
any accompanying explanation.
And there would be no reason to expect that. Even if, in the past (in the ab-
sence of a binding lower bound constraint), uctuations in the monetary base have
been extremely persistent, there would be no reason for people to expect that an ex-
traordinary increase in the supply of bank reserves as part of a \quantitative easing"
policy would have the same kind of consequences for the long-run monetary base as
past variations in the supply of reserves. There is certainly nothing about such an
increase in the supply of bank reserves that is, for mechanical reasons, dicult to
reverse. Indeed, Japan's experience with quantitative easing illustrates this.
2.2 Quantitative Easing in Practice
As noted above, the term \quantitative easing" was introduced by the Bank of Japan
in March 2001, to describe a new policy which replaced its previous operating target
for an overnight interest rate (the call rate, which had been near zero much of the
time for a few years at that point) by quantity targets for the supply of bank reserves
(current account balances). While the complete set of policy measures undertaken
was (not surprisingly) fairly complex, the basic thrust of the policy was fairly close
to providing an illustration of the kind of policy to which the irrelevance results of
Krugman (1998) and Eggertsson and Woodford (2003) should apply.40
The explicit intention of the policy was to increase the supply of bank reserves
beyond the level required to keep the policy rate near zero, and policy announcements
focused on the BOJ's quantity targets for current account balances. Importantly,
there was no commitment to maintain the increased supply of reserves permanently,
and indeed they were promptly withdrawn once the justication for a special regime
was considered to have passed. As Figure 14 shows, most of the increase in current
account balances was reversed, in the space of a few months, after the policy was
suspended in March 2006, as a result of CPI ination that had been measured to be
slightly above zero. The Japanese monetary base resumed a path that was close to
a continuation of its trend prior to the QE period; hence market participants who
had continued to hold expectations about the long-run Japanese monetary base that
were unchanged as a result of the QE policy would not have been far o in their
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Figure 14: The evolution of the monetary base in Japan; the region between the
curve labeled `monetary base' and the one labeled `currency' indicates the quantity
of current account balances. The rst grey region indicates the period of the Bank of
Japan's policy of \quantitative easing"; the second grey region indicates the period
of its policy of \comprehensive monetary easing." Units (left scale): trillions of yen.
Source: Bank of Japan and Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.
prediction.
And as the theoretical models would predict | but contrary to the quantity-
theoretic reasoning that had provided the basis for the policy proposal | there was
little eect of the policy on aggregate nominal expenditure. As shown in Figure 14,
the increased supply of bank reserves raised the total monetary base by 60 percent
over the rst two years of the policy, and eventually by nearly 75 percent. Yet there
was no corresponding increase in aggregate nominal expenditure: nominal GDP was
only six percent higher after ve years of QE than it had been in the rst quarter of
2001, despite a massive increase in the monetary base. And as the gure also shows,
deation (here measured by the GDP deator) continued unabated.
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A number of studies of the eects of this experiment attribute some reduction in
longer-term bond yields to it, though without measurable consequences for aggregate
demand or the rate of deation. But it is not obvious that even these asset-price
eects should be attributed to the \pure quantitative easing" aspect of the BOJ's
policy. The introduction of the new policy in March 2001 was also accompanied by a
new and stronger form of forward guidance: the BOJ committed to maintain reserve
balances large enough to keep the overnight interest rate near zero until CPI ination
became zero or higher on a sustained basis.41
A number of scholars conclude that this new commitment as to the duration of
the zero-interest-rate policy had substantial eects on market expectations regarding
future short-term interest rates, and through this expectation channel on longer-term
interest rates (Okina and Shiratsuka, 2004; Oda and Ueda, 2007; Ugai, 2007). Some
studies also conclude that the composition of the BOJ's asset purchases aected yields
on the particular type of assets purchased; in particular, the term premia on longer-
term Japanese Government Bonds may have been reduced by the BOJ's purchases.
But few authors nd any evidence of eects of variation in the BOJ's quantity targets
for current account balances, and hence for eects that can be attributed to pure
quantitative easing (Ueda, 2012a, 2012b).
The BOJ itself appears no longer to put great stock in pure QE as a policy. Its
\comprehensive monetary easing" policy, introduced in October 2010 in response to
continuing concerns about the economic outlook, has again resulted in a signicant
increase in the size of the BOJ's balance sheet, but does not involve quantitative
targets for current account balances. Instead, its main elements are a \virtually
zero" target for the call rate, and forward guidance about the conditions that will
41Note that this was the type of forward guidance that, according to the argument made above,
should be particularly likely to matter: one which stated a promise about the criteria that would
determine future interest-rate policy, rather than simply oering a forecast of the forward path
of the policy rate. However, the commitment was less ambitious than the kind recommended by
the discussion above: because it focused only on the rate of ination going forward, rather than
committing to make up for past price-level declines, it was not a commitment that, even if fully
credible, should have done much to eliminate the distortions resulting from the zero lower bound. In
the model of Eggertsson and Woodford (2003), a fully credible commitment of this form would have
no eect: the severely contractionary and deationary equilibrium that they display is associated
with policy expectations under which the policy rate is never raised above zero until it is possible
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Figure 15: The evolution of the monetary base in the United States, using the same
format as in Figure 15. The grey regions identify two periods of unusual balance-sheet
expansion discussed further in the text. Units (left scale): billions of dollars. Source:
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.
determine how long the low target will be maintained; targeted purchases of a variety
of specic types of assets; and a credit facility that supplies funds for relatively long
terms at a xed rate, against specic types of collateral, as a relatively direct way
of lowering longer-term interest rates (Lam, 2011). These latter programs appear to
have had some eects on asset prices, but as Figure 14 shows, there is little evidence
of any immediate eect of the associated expansion of the monetary base on aggregate
nominal expenditure, of the kind posited by quantity theorists.
The even more massive increases in the monetary base by the Federal Reserve's
unconventional policies since the fall of 2008 have similarly had little evident eect
on aggregate nominal expenditure, as shown in Figure 15. The grey regions in this
gure mark two periods over which the FOMC has substantially increased the size
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of the Fed's balance sheet.42 While neither of these policy changes was ocially
described as a program of pure quantitative easing | and Chairman Bernanke, in a
speech in January 2009, explicitly denied that the Fed's rst planned program of asset
purchases constituted \quantitative easing" (Bernanke, 2009) | proponents of that
theory might suppose that the real eect of these programs resulted from the way
that they increased the supply of base money, regardless of its ocial justication.
But there has been little sign of the eects that that theory would predict. As shown
in the gure, the US monetary base has more than tripled since September 2008, but
the growth in nominal GDP from the last quarter of 2008 to the second quarter of
2012 has been less than 11 percent. There has similarly been as yet little sign of any
acceleration of ination, despite the warnings of some monetarists. Thus such eects
as the programs have had (which are discussed further below) do not seem to support
the theory of pure quantitative easing.
3 Targeted Asset Purchases
I turn now to the question of the way in which it should be expected to matter what
the central bank holds on the asset side of its balance sheet. As noted above, the
argument already given for the irrelevance of purchases of short-term Treasury bills
by creating additional bank reserves also implies that there should be no dierence
between purchases of longer-term assets that are nanced by creating additional bank
reserves and purchases of longer-term assets that are nanced by selling short-term
Treasury bills previously held by the central bank (as under the Fed's Maturity Ex-
tension Program). But what eect should one expect there to be of an increase in
central-bank purchases of longer-term assets, under either of those scenarios? Once
again, I begin with a brief review of the theoretical literature and then turn to the
lessons that may be gleaned from recent experience, focusing on the several recent
asset-purchase programs of the Federal Reserve.
42The rst is the period beginning immediately after the failure of Lehman Brothers (in the third
week of September, 2011), when a number of special liquidity facilities and credit programs were
either introduced or greatly expanded, and concluding with the end of the Fed's rst series of large-
scale asset purchases (LSAP1) in March 2010; the second is the Fed's second program of large-scale
asset purchases (LSAP2), beginning in November 2010 and ending in June 2011.
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3.1 Eects of Targeted Asset Purchases in Theory
It is often supposed that open-market purchases of securities by the central bank must
inevitably aect the market prices of those securities (and hence other prices and
quantities as well), through what is called a \portfolio-balance eect": if the central
bank holds less of certain assets and more of others, then the private sector is forced
(as a requirement for equilibrium) to hold more of the former and less of the latter, and
a change in the relative prices of the assets will almost always be required to induce the
private parties to change the portfolios that they prefer. In order for such an eect to
exist, it is thought to suce that private parties not be perfectly indierent between
the two types of assets; and there are all sorts of reasons why dierences in the risky
payos associated with dierent assets should make them not perfect substitutes,
even in a world with frictionless nancial markets. Thus while many authors would
agree that central-bank exchanges of very short-maturity Treasury bills for overnight
balances at the central bank should have little consequence, once the interest rate
on the Treasury bills has fallen to essentially the level of the interest rate paid on
reserves | on the ground that in this case, the instruments being exchanged are close
to being perfect substitutes | they assume that this should not be equally true of
central-bank purchases of other types of assets, including longer-maturity Treasury
securities.
But it is important to note that such \portfolio-balance eects" do not exist in
a modern, general-equilibrium theory of asset prices | in which assets are assumed
to be valued for their state-contingent payos in dierent states of the world, and in-
vestors are assumed to correctly anticipate the consequences of their portfolio choices
for their wealth in dierent future states | at least to the extent that nancial
markets are modeled as frictionless. It is clearly inconsistent with a representative-
household asset pricing theory (even though the argument sketched above, and many
classic expositions of portfolio-balance theory, make no reference to any heterogeneity
on the part of private investors). In the representative-household theory, the market
price of any asset should be determined by the present value of the random returns
to which it is a claim, where the present value is calculated using an asset pricing ker-
nel (stochastic discount factor) derived from the representative household's marginal
utility of income in dierent future states of the world. Insofar as a mere re-shuing
of assets between the central bank and the private sector should not change the real
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quantity of resources available for consumption in each state of the world, the repre-
sentative household's marginal utility of income in dierent states of the world should
not change. Hence the pricing kernel should not change, and the market price of one
unit of a given asset should not change, either, assuming that the risky returns to
which the asset represents a claim have not changed.
How does 1950s-vintage \portfolio-balance" theory obtain a dierent result, even
when the private sector is represented by a representative mean-variance investor?
It assumes that if the private sector is forced to hold a portfolio that includes more
exposure to a particular risk | say, a low return in the event of a real-estate crash
| then private investors' willingness to hold that particular risk will be reduced:
investors will anticipate a higher marginal utility of income in the state in which
the real-estate crash occurs, and so will pay less than before for securities that have
especially low returns in that state. But the fact that the central bank takes the
real-estate risk onto its own balance sheet, and allows the representative household
to hold only securities that pay as much in the event of a crash as in other states, does
not make the risk disappear from the economy. The central bank's earnings on its
portfolio will be lower in the crash state as a result of the asset exchange, and this will
mean lower earnings distributed to the Treasury, which will in turn mean that higher
taxes will have to be collected by the government from the private sector in that
state; so the representative household's after-tax income will be just as dependent
on the real-estate risk as before. This is why the asset pricing kernel in a modern
representative-household asset-pricing model does not change, and why asset prices
are unaected by the open-market operation.43
The irrelevance result is easiest to derive in the context of a representative-
household model, but in fact it does not depend on the existence of a representative
household, nor upon the existence of a complete set of nancial markets. All that
one needs for the argument are the assumptions that (i) the assets in question are
valued only for their pecuniary returns | they may not be perfect substitutes from
the standpoint of investors, owing to dierent risk characteristics, but not for any
other reason | and that (ii) all investors can purchase arbitrary quantities of the
same assets at the same (market) prices, with no binding constraints on the positions
43Eggertsson and Woodford (2003) nd in the context of a representative-household model that
it does not matter which assets a central bank purchases in its open-market operations, precisely
because of this reasoning.
62
that any investor can take, other than her overall budget constraint.
Under these assumptions, the irrelevance of central-bank open-market operations
is essentially a Modigliani-Miller result, as noted by Wallace (1981). If the central
bank buys more of asset x by selling shares of asset y, private investors should wish
purchase more of asset y and divest themselves of asset x, by exactly the amounts
that undo the eects of the central bank's trades. The reason that they optimally
choose to do this is in order to hedge the additional tax/transfer income risk that
they take on as a result of the change in the central bank's portfolio. If share h of
the returns on the central bank's portfolio are distributed to household h, where the
fhg are a set of weights that sum to 1, then household h should choose a trade that
cancels exactly fraction h of the central bank's trade, in order to aord exactly the
same state-contingent consumption stream as before. Summing over all households,
the private sector chooses trades that in aggregate precisely cancel the central bank's
trade. The result obtains even if dierent households have very dierent attitudes
toward risk, dierent time proles of income, dierent types of non-tradeable income
risk that they need to hedge, and so on, and regardless of how large or small the set of
marketed securities may be. One can easily introduce heterogeneity of the kind that
is often invoked as an explanation of time-varying risk premia without this implying
that any \portfolio-balance" eects of central-bank transactions should exist.
Many readers of Wallace (1981) are likely to have found his result paradoxical,
and doubted the practical relevance of the entire line of reasoning. For the result
seemed to imply not only that exchanges of Treasuries for mortgage-backed securities
by the Federal Reserve, holding xed the overall size of the Fed's balance sheet,
should have no eect, but also that increases in the supply of bank reserves as a
result of open-market purchases of Treasuries should have no eect. Yet the latter
kind of open-market operation had long been routinely used by the Fed to bring
about desired changes in the federal funds rate, as every undergraduate learns. The
theory seemed patently inapplicable to the operations of actual central banks in actual
market economies.
Moreover, it is clear that overnight balances at the Fed have often been held de-
spite being dominated in rate of return; until October 2008, these balances earned a
zero nominal return, while other overnight interest rates (such as the federal funds
rate) were invariably higher, for reasons that cannot be attributed purely to default
risk. A natural (and thoroughly conventional) inference is that this particular asset
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is (or at least, has often been) held for reasons beyond its pecuniary return alone; we
may suppose that reserves at the Fed (and base money more generally) supply trans-
actions services, by relaxing constraints that would otherwise restrict the transactions
in which the holders of the asset can engage. The existence of these non-pecuniary
returns | which may be modeled using any of a variety of familiar devices | will
invalidate the Wallace (1981) neutrality result, at least insofar as open-market pur-
chases of securities that increase the supply of reserves are concerned.
But one can introduce a transactions role for reserves, or for monetary liabilities
of the central bank more generally, however, while still entertaining the hypothesis
that with regard to all assets other than monetary liabilities of the central bank,
the two postulates still hold: assets other than \money" are valued only for their
pecuniary returns, and all investors can purchase arbitrary quantities of any of these
assets at the same (market) prices. In this case, a weaker version of the irrelevance
result for central-bank trades still applies. No open-market operation that changes
the composition of the central bank's asset portfolio, while keeping unchanged the
outstanding volume of the monetary liabilities of the central bank, should have any
eects on asset prices, goods prices, or the allocation of resources.44 Again, the
argument is essentially a Modigliani-Miller theorem, and holds despite an arbitrary
degree of heterogeneity in the situations of dierent households, and regardless of the
size of the set of traded securities.
The result in this case validates the classic monetarist position: the supply of
monetary liabilities by the central bank matters for macroeconomic equilibrium, but
it does not matter at all what kinds of assets might \back" those liabilities on the
other side of the central bank's balance sheet, or how the base money gets to be in
circulation. Hence a generation or two of texts in monetary economics have found
it convenient to analyze monetary policy using models in which there is no central-
bank balance sheet | merely a government printing press which creates additional
\money" at a greater or lesser rate, which is then put in the hands of private parties,
perhaps by dropping it from helicopters. Again, the omission is completely justiable,
if nancial markets function eciently enough for the two postulates mentioned above
to hold, except for the qualication regarding the special properties of \money."
44This is the result obtained by Eggertsson and Woodford (2003), in the context of a
representative-household model with transactions services represented by money in the utility func-
tion.
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Under this view, there would be still be no ground for viewing targeted asset
purchases as a relevant dimension of central-bank policy, though variations in the
supply of monetary central-bank liabilities would matter. This might seem to support
the doctrine of pure quantitative easing discussed in the previous section: the aim of
policy should simply be to achieve a sucient expansion in the monetary base, with
the particular assets purchased being irrelevant to the consequences that should be
expected for aggregate demand. But the kind of model just sketched would provide
no support for a policy of pure quantitative easing, either. Expansion of the supply
of bank reserves stimulates aggregate demand under normal circumstances, as it
ordinarily implies a reduction in the short-term riskless rate of interest; yet once the
supply of reserves is sucient to drive the short-term riskless rate to zero (or to the
rate of interest paid on reserves), there is no reason to expect further increases in the
supply of reserves to increase aggregate demand any further, as argued in the previous
section. Once banks are no longer foregoing any otherwise available pecuniary return
in order to hold reserves, there is no reason to believe that reserves continue to
supply any liquidity services at the margin; and if they do not, the Modigliani-Miller
reasoning applies once again to open market operations that increase the supply of
reserves, just as in the model of Wallace.
It is possible, of course, that assets other than just the monetary liabilities of
the central bank may be valued for their role in facilitating transactions, and not
merely for their state-contingent pecuniary returns. For example, Krishnamurthy
and Vissing-Jorgensen (2012a) present evidence that variations in the supply of US
Treasury debt inuence market yields on Treasury securities, and interpret this as
evidence of a \safety premium" associated with uses in the nancial sector for certain
especially safe assets such as Treasuries (for example, as collateral in repo transac-
tions), that increases the market value of these securities beyond what would follow
from their state-contingent pecuniary returns alone. In the presence of such a pre-
mium, even the generalized irrelevance result stated above would not necessarily be
valid, in the case of central-bank transactions involving sales or purchases of long-term
Treasuries.
One's conclusions depend on how the \safety premium" is modeled. If one sup-
poses that there is one kind of convenience yield, supplied by both Fed liabilities (base
money) and Treasury debt to diering extents, then while the existence of a conve-
nience yield in connection with Treasury securities would require modication of the
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restricted irrelevance proposition stated above (it would not, in general, be enough
that the central bank's trades leave xed the supply of base money), it would not
imply any new opportunities for eective open-market operations at the zero lower
bound. For once there is a sucient supply of bank reserves for the shadow value
of the convenience yield to be zero (as shown by the disappearance of a dierential
between the overnight rate and the interest rate on reserves), the contribution of the
safety premium to the market value of Treasuries should also be zero, and continue
to be regardless of modest variations in the quantity of safe assets in the hands of
the public.
Alternatively, one might suppose that Treasuries supply a convenience yield of a
dierent sort than is provided by bank reserves, so that the fact that the liquidity
premium for bank reserves has fallen to zero would not necessarily imply that there
could not still be a positive safety premium for Treasuries. This possibility is sug-
gested by the ndings of Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2011) with regard
to the eects of Fed asset purchases even with the federal funds rate at its lower
bound, discussed in the next section. If so, it should still be possible for central-bank
purchases or sales of long-term Treasury securities to aect the size of the safety
premium, and so to aect long-term yields even in the absence of any change in the
expected path of short rates.
But even in this case, such a model would not provide a justication for central-
bank purchases of long-term Treasury securities as a way of stimulating the economy
when constrained by the interest-rate lower bound. First of all, even though purchases
of long-term Treasuries could raise the price of (and so lower the yield on) Treasuries,
this would not necessarily imply any reduction in other long-term interest rates, since
the increase in the price of Treasuries would reect an increase in the safety premium,
and not necessarily any increase in their price apart from the safety premium (and
hence not necessarily any reduction in the discount rate that the market uses to
value future payments). This means that while the US Treasury would then be able
to nance itself more cheaply at the margin, there would not necessarily be any such
benet for private borrowers, and hence any stimulus to aggregate expenditure.
Moreover, as Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2012b) note, an increase in
the safety premium obtained by making \safe assets" (in the relevant sense) more
scarce would in itself be welfare-reducing. If Treasuries provide a convenience yield
not available from other assets (including bank reserves), then reducing the quantity
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of Treasuries in the hands of the public reduces the benets obtained from this service
ow; and supplying more reserves instead would not replace the convenience yield
from Treasuries with a dierent convenience yield of equal value, since (under the
hypothesis of short-term interest rates at the lower bound) additional reserves would
supply a marginal convenience yield of zero (given that reserves are already supplied
beyond the satiation level). This points to an important lesson of greater generality:
it is not reasonable to consider policy successful simply because it can raise the price
of some asset by whatever means. It matters which asset prices are aected, and it
matters which distortions are created in order to aect the equilibrium valuations of
those assets.
Another reason for the irrelevance result stated above not to hold in practice
can be the existence of binding constraints on participation in particular markets or
on the positions that particular traders can take in those markets.45 Suppose, for
example, that certain assets are only purchased (or only purchased at low cost) by
\specialists", who have an advantage over other investors in this particular activity.
The Modigliani-Miller theorem no longer holds if the central bank purchases assets
of this kind, if not all of the addition to the central bank's state-contingent portfolio
earnings is distributed to the \specialists"; for other investors will not reduce their
holdings of the assets in question, even if the change in their state-contingent tax
liabilities gives them a hedging motive for doing so, owing to their non-participation
in that market. Moreover, under this mechanism, the central bank's purchases have
a disproportionate eect on demand for the particular assets that it purchases, and
the hypothesis of market segmentation makes it particularly likely that a substantial
change in the price of those particular assets will be required for market clearing.
Market segmentation of this kind is particularly likely to be important (and po-
tentially a source of signicant ineciencies) during times of nancial turmoil like
that following the failure of Lehman Brothers, and the kind of theory just sketched
provides a plausible account of the relevance of various special credit programs of
the Fed in that period. For example, Woodford (2011b) discusses how the eects of
the Fed's Commercial Paper Funding Facility, introduced in October 2008, on spreads
between commercial-paper yields and other money-market rates might be understood
45Examples of general-equilibrium analyses in which central-bank asset purchases are shown to
aect both asset prices and the allocation of resources because of the existence of such constraints
include Curdia and Woodford (2011) and Araujo et al. (2011).
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in these terms.46 In this application, the sharp increase in these spreads after the
run on money market mutual funds provides a plausible case for segmentation of this
market, at least at that point in time, so it is not surprising that the introduction of
the Fed's facility would make a considerable dierence. Such an example shows that
at least under some circumstances, central-bank purchases can be expected to inu-
ence asset prices. But two caveats are necessary about the generality of the lesson
that should be drawn from it.
First, the example relates to a particularly severe moment of market disruption.
The fact of market segmentation at such a time does not imply that it is equally
signicant under more routine conditions. By February 2010 the Fed had closed the
CPFF, along with most of the other special credit facilities created in response to the
nancial crisis, on the ground that markets could again function relatively well on
their own; to the extent that that judgment was correct, one should not expect that
targeted purchases (or provision of nancing for such a specic category of assets)
would have similar eects today.
Second, the existence of market segmentation makes it possible for central-bank
purchases to aect the price of an asset, but at the same time limits the generality
of the eects of a change in that particular asset price on the rest of the economy.
In order for the policy to be judged eective, it is necessary that inuencing that
particular asset price can be expected to achieve an important aim. In the case of the
CPFF, this presumably was the case | only the nancing costs of a particular nar-
row class of borrowers were aected, rather than nancial conditions more generally,
but the program achieved a specic goal that motivated its creation. One cannot,
however, point to such a program as evidence that purchasing any kind of assets
eases nancial conditions generally. Instead, to the extent that market segmentation
is relied upon as the basis for a policy's eectiveness, one should expect the eects
to be relatively local, and the composition of the asset purchases needs to be tailored
to the desired eect.
46For further discussion of the crisis in the commercial paper market, this Fed program, and its
eects, see Adrian et al. (2010) and Kacperczyk and Schnabl (2010).
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3.2 Eects of the Fed's Large-Scale Asset-Purchase Programs
Since reaching the zero lower bound for its federal funds rate operating target late in
2008, the Federal Reserve has undertaken a number of targeted asset-purchase pro-
grams. These include the Fed's rst Large-Scale Asset Purchase program (LSAP1),
rst announced in November 2008, and eventually involving purchases of $1.75 tril-
lion of longer-term securities ($1.25 trillion of which were mortgage-backed securities),
over a period extending through March 2010; a second such program (LSAP2), rst
hinted at in a speech by Chairman Bernanke in August 2010 and made denite in
November of that year, under which another $600 billion of longer-term Treasuries
were purchased, over a period extending through June 2011; and the Fed's Maturity
Extension Program (MEP), rst announced in September 2011 and then extended
in June of this year, which involves purchases of long-term Treasuries coupled with
sales of an equal quantity of short-term Treasuries, in an amount that is envisioned to
reach more than $650 billion by the end of the year. (The timing of these programs,
and their consequences for the asset side of the Fed's balance sheet, are shown in
Figure 16.47) These programs have resulted in a substantial increase in the size of
the Fed's balance sheet, but even more notably, they have resulted in a great increase
in the degree to which the Fed holds longer-term securities, rather than relatively
short-dated Treasury bills, on its balance sheet.
3.2.1 Have They Lowered Long-Term Interest Rates?
The declared intention of the programs has been to lower the market yields (and hence
to raise the prices) of longer-term bonds (not necessarily limited to the particular
types purchased by the Fed), with a view to easing the terms on which credit is
available to both households and rms in the US. Their eectiveness in this regard
47The shaded grey region for each program indicates the period of time over which purchases
occurred. LSAP1 is accordingly dated from January 5, 2009 through the end of March 2010; LSAP2
is dated from November 12, 2010 through the end of June 2011; and MEP is dated from October
3, 2011 through the present. Some eects of the programs on bond yields might, of course, have
occurred before the start of the grey region, to the extent the programs were announced prior to
these start dates. Thus LSAP1 might alternatively be dated from the FOMC's announcement of the
program on November 25, 2008, while LSAP2 might be dated from Chairman Bernanke's speech
on August 27, 2010 indicating support for such a program. See the Appendix for a chronology of
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Figure 16: The evolution of Federal Reserve securities holdings, compared with the
evolution of the yield on 10-year Treasuries. The grey regions identify three programs
under which the Fed has increased its holdings of longer-term securities, discussed
in the text. Units: (left scale) trillions of dollars; (right scale) percent per annum.
Source: Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.
is a matter of considerable debate. As shown in Figure 16, the yield on 10-year
Treasuries has shown a general downward trend since late 2008. But this should
not necessarily be attributed solely to the Fed's purchases of longer-term securities
over this period; the period is one in which a continuing series of bad news has
progressively increased the likelihood that market participants are likely to attach
to the possibility of a protracted period of feeble economic growth and low ination
(or even deation), and of course the FOMC has progressively extended farther into
the future the length of the period for which it anticipates keeping its funds rate
target in a band just above zero. Hence it is plausible to suppose that expectations
regarding the length of time that short-term interest rates are likely to remain low
have generally increased since the fall of 2008 (when it was not yet even obvious that
the zero lower bound would be reached).
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Indeed, a comparison of the timing of the increases in the Fed's holdings of long-
term bonds with the timing of the declines in the 10-year yield does not obviously
support a portfolio-balance interpretation of the overall decline in long-term inter-
est rates; the 10-year yield actually rose over the course of the LSAP1 and LSAP2
purchase programs, rather than declining. There was a substantial decline in the
10-year yield around the time that LSAP1 was announced, but this might well be
attributed to the dramatically worsening economic conditions (the very conditions
that motivated the FOMC to consider so bold an experiment), rather than to the
announcement of the FOMC's intended purchases. Long-term bond yields then be-
gan rising again as concerns about immediate economic collapse began to abate over
the course of 2009, despite the fact that the Fed was increasing its bond purchases.
The most important subsequent declines in long-term bond yields might similarly
have had more to do with the deteriorating conditions that triggered the adoption
of each of the next two asset-purchase programs, than with anticipation that further
purchases would occur.48
A closer analysis of market movements around the time of particular announce-
ments connected with the asset-purchase programs has nonetheless suggested that
these announcements have had important eects on the market pricing of long-term
bonds. In one particularly inuential study, Gagnon et al. (2011) consider the market
responses to eight specic ocial Fed communications that contained new informa-
tion about the LSAP1 program (listed in the Appendix below), and look at changes
in bond yields over a one-day window around each announcement. They argue that
with one small exception,49 the direction of the change in bond yields each day is
the one that would be expected, under a portfolio-balance theory of the eects of
Fed asset purchases, given the news in the statement | statements indicating larger
asset purchases than had previously been announced were associated with reduced
48The fact that the stock market has also declined in value during each of the three periods when
there were sustained declines in long-term bond yields supports this interpretation.
49On September 23, 2009, long-term interest rates fell slightly despite FOMC language that might
have been expected to reduce the size of the Fed's asset purchases, but the decline was modest: yields
on 10-year US Treasuries and 10-year agency debt each fell by 3 basis points that day. It is worth
noting that the 10-year OIS rate fell by 5 basis points that day, which means that this date was not
at all an outlier with respect to the pattern shown in Figure 18 below. A possible interpretation is
that changes in the statement's implications for the likely future path of the funds rate were more
important than its implications for the quantity of asset purchases.
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bond yields, and statements indicating smaller asset purchases with increased bond
yields. The cumulative change in the level of long-term interest rates obtained by
summing the one-day changes on the announcement days was substantial: a 91-basis-
point decline in the yield on 10-year Treasuries, a 113-basis-point decline in the yield
on agency MBS, and a 156-basis-point decline in the yield on 10-year agency debt.
Moreover, there was even a cumulative decline of 67 basis points in the yields on Baa-
rated corporate bonds, which the authors took as evidence that the LSAP program
had a broad-based eect on the costs of borrowing, not limited to its eects on the
prices of the particular types of assets purchased by the Fed.
Of course, taking the sum of the market movements on these announcement days
only as a measure of the cumulative eect of the program as a whole | rather than,
say, the cumulative change in long-term interest rates over the entire period of the
program, shown in Figure 16 | depends on believing that the program should only
inuence bond prices at the times when there is news that changes the expected size of
the program, and that the eects of news are (nearly) immediate and permanent. The
latter assumptions are familiar ones in event studies in nancial economics, of course;
but it is important to recall that the justication for this familiar methodology is an
assumption that securities markets are \ecient," so that expected returns looking
forward from any point in time are essentially constant (which requires that the eects
of news on prices be realized instantaneously and not be subsequently reversed).
Such an assumption is not obviously consistent with the existence of eects of Fed
purchases on the prices of securities that the study is intended to demonstrate; for
if the quantity purchased inuences the price of a security, then the market is not
ecient in the Samuelson-Fama sense. It is true enough that, as Gagnon et al. point
out, there are many other factors that might be aecting the cumulative change in
long-term bond prices over the entire LSAP1 period, so that one cannot regard that
cumulative change as a measure of the eect of the program; but it is not clear that
their announcement-days-only measure should be regarded as correct, either.
3.2.2 How Much of the Eect Is Due to News About Future Policy?
An even more serious question about the interpretation of such event studies is
whether one should believe that the news about the likely size and character of the
central bank's asset purchases is the only thing that should move nancial markets
on that day. The one-day window is narrow enough that, in most cases, one can
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plausibly argue that the FOMC's statement was the only big news aecting xed-
income markets that day; but it is less obvious that the only news in the statement
was information about the likely size of the asset-purchase program. In particular, if
the statement also contained information that changed expectations about the future
path of the federal funds rate, then bond yields should have changed on those days,
even in a world where there are no portfolio-balance eects.
And of course, because the FOMC concentrates its main ocial communications
at particular points in time, it would hardly be coincidental for there to be news that
should aect forecasts of the funds rate on the same days as there was news about
the asset-purchase program. It is true that there were no changes in the target range
for the funds rate after December 2008, but as explained above, expectations about
how long the funds rate would remain at that level and how fast it might eventually
rise did not remain constant, and should have been critical determinants of long-term
bond yields. As it happens, the two dates considered by Gagnon et al. on which
there were the largest declines in long bond yields | accounting for 73 basis points
out of the cumulative 91-basis-point decline that they report | were both dates
on which there were very important statements about the funds rate target. These
were December 16, 2008 (on which, in addition to a dramatic immediate cut in the
funds rate target from 1.0 percent to the 0-25 basis point target band, the FOMC
announced that it expected to maintain the low level \for some time") and March
18, 2009 (on which the FOMC rst announced that it expected to maintain the low
level of the funds rate \for an extended period"). Attributing all of the declines in
long-term bond yields on these days to the LSAP news is surely an exaggeration.
Even on dates when the FOMC statement contains no change in the funds rate
target or in any explicit forward guidance with regard to the funds rate, it does
not follow that expectations about the future path of the funds rate should not
have changed as a result of the announcement. Each statement always contains a
summary of the FOMC's view of the outlook for real activity and ination, and a
statement indicating greater perceived downside risk or less worry about ination on
the horizon could be a reason to reduce the probability assigned to an increase in the
funds rate anytime soon. (It would not be coincidental if there were more language
of that sort in statements that also reveal that the Committee has decided to expand
asset purchases.) In addition, the LSAP announcement itself might be taken to have
implications for future interest-rate policy: a decision to increase asset purchases
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might be thought to reveal something about the shifting balance of inuence among
dierent opinions on the Committee, or about how troubling the FOMC's information
about the economic outlook really is.
In fact, market-based measures of expectations regarding the future path of the
funds rate indicate important shifts in expectations not only on the two dates just
mentioned, but on other dates on which FOMC announcements contained news about
asset purchases as well. One measure of the extent to which FOMC statements
contain news about the future funds-rate path (as opposed to the current funds rate)
is the \path factor" computed using the method of Gurkaynak et al. (2005), on the
basis of changes in fed funds futures prices around announcements (discussed above
in section 1.2.1). Campbell et al. (2012) compare this measure of the news about
future interest-rate policy on announcement days with the change in the yield on
10-year Treasury notes on the same day.
As shown in Figure 17, not only is there a fairly strong positive correlation between
the news about interest-rate policy and the change in the long-term bond yield,
but, except for one outlier,50 the points in the gure corresponding to important
announcement dates connected with the LSAP1 and LSAP2 programs51 display a
similar relationship between the two changes as the one that is found in the case of
other FOMC statement dates on which there were no announcements about asset
50This is the statement of March 18, 2009, described further in the Appendix, which contained
both important news about the LSAP1 program and additional forward guidance with regard to
interest-rate policy. The size of the decline in the 10-year Treasury yield that day was much larger
than would normally accompany a negative \path factor" of the size measured that day, suggesting
that the news that the Fed would purchase a large quantity of longer-term Treasuries did reduce
Treasury yields, beyond what was justied by the reduction in expected future short-term interest
rates. In the gure of Campbell et al. (2012), this point is an even larger outlier, as they compute a
large positive, rather than a negative \path factor" for that day, but this reects a doubtful measure
of the change in futures prices that day. The measures used by both Krishnamurthy and Vissing-
Jorgensen (2011, Table 2) and Bauer and Rudebusch (2011, Table 3) indicate that the expected
federal funds rate declined at all future horizons, rather than rising sharply at longer horizons as
implied by the calculations of Campbell et al. In Figure 17, the path factor for March 18, 2009
is calculated using the factor loadings of Campbell et al., but using estimates of the futures rate
changes for horizons longer than 6 months computed using the method of Bauer and Rudebusch
(2011), which produces numbers fairly similar to those reported by Krishnamurthy and Vissing-
Jorgensen. The path factors computed by Campbell et al. are plotted for all other announcement
dates.
51See the Appendix for a list of these dates.
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Figure 17: One-day changes in the yield on a 10-year Treasury note compared to the
\path factor" measured from changes in federal funds rate futures on that day, for
each of the FOMC announcement dates between August 2007 and December 2011.
Dates of important announcements about LSAP programs are distinguished from
other FOMC statements. Units (vertical axis): basis points. Source: Campbell et al.
(2012) and author's calculations.
purchases. (The complete sample of dates considered in the gure includes all of the
FOMC meetings between the beginning of the nancial crisis in August 2007 and
December 2011, plus the November 25, 2008 press release announcing the LSAP1
program.) The positive association between the \path factor" and changes in long-
term bond yields on the dates of FOMC post-meeting statements conrms the result
obtained by Gurkaynak et al. (2005) for an earlier period, that they had presented as
evidence that the information about future interest-rate policy contained in FOMC
statements aected long-term bond yields. The fact that one also observes on the
LSAP announcement dates changes in bond yields reasonably similar to what one
would expect, given this relationship, from the news in that announcement about
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Figure 18: One-day changes in the 10-year zero-coupon Treasury yield compared to
the change in the 10-year OIS rate on that day, for each of the dates of major FOMC
announcements about asset-purchase programs listed in the Appendix. Units (both
axes): basis points. Source: Bloomberg, Federal Reserve Board.
future interest-rate policy (as measured by the \path factor") suggests that the eect
of the statement on bond yields may occur mainly as a result of the information
conveyed about the likely path of the funds rate.
Another common market-based measure of expectations of the forward path of
the funds rate is given by OIS rates, as also discussed above. Figure 18 compares
the one-day changes in the 10-year zero-coupon Treasury yield52 on the dates of
important FOMC announcements connected with the LSAP1, LSAP2, and MEP
programs with the one-day change in the 10-year OIS rate on the same day. (Here
the eight LSAP1 announcement dates are the same ones as in the study of Gagnon
52As in Bauer and Rudebusch (2011), these are constructed as in Gurkaynak et al. (2007b), and
available online at http://www.federalreserve.gov/econresdata/researchdata.htm (accessed August
10, 2012).
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et al., 2011, but additional dates relating to the LSAP2 and MEP programs are
added for purposes of comparison.53) As noted by Bauer and Rudebusch (2011), who
make a similar comparison in the case of the eight LSAP1 dates, there is a great
deal of similarity in the two changes. The gure shows that this is equally true of the
announcements connected with all three of the FOMC's major programs of long-term
asset purchases.54
If we take the change in the 10-year OIS rate as due solely to a change in ex-
pectations about the path of the funds rate over the next 10 years, this gure would
suggest that much of the response of long-term Treasury yields on LSAP announce-
ment dates can be attributed to the change in those expectations as a result of news
in the FOMC's statement. It would be too simplistic to insist that this is the only
possible interpretation of the change in the OIS rate; while shorter-maturity OIS rates
can reasonably be considered mainly to reect the expected path of the funds rate
over the relevant horizon (as in the discussion in section 1.2.2), the 10-year OIS rate
might well involve a non-trivial term premium. Bauer and Rudebusch (2011) sug-
gest that one might nonetheless take the correlation shown in the gure to indicate
that portfolio-balance eects are small, under an identifying assumption according
to which such eects should be specic to the particular security purchased by the
central bank | and hence should aect the yields on Treasuries but not the swap
rates. This would reect one possible view of the type of market segmentation that
could lead to substantial price eects of central-bank purchases, but it is not the only
53The complete list of announcement dates is given in the Appendix.
54As indicated in the gure, the two occasions on which there has been the largest discrepancy
between the change in the OIS rate and the change in the bond yield are December 16, 2008, and
March 18, 2009 | two dates that both involved important changes in the FOMC's explicit forward
guidance (as discussed in section 1.2.2) in addition to announcements about the LSAP1 program.
These were also the dates of the two largest changes in the OIS rate in this sample, and one might
well suppose that the nature of the new information about likely future policy on these days diered
from the other days in ways that go beyond merely being larger in magnitude. While the anomalous
outcome on March 18 is consistent with the view that the FOMC's announcement of an intention
to purchase longer-term Treasuries increased the market price of those securities over and above the
valuation that would be implied by expectations of the path of short rates (as was also true of the
anomaly in Figure 17 connected with that day), the anomaly on December 16 is of the opposite kind:
the decline in the 10-year yield is smaller than the decline in the OIS rate, so that, to the extent
that the discrepancy is thought to reect a \portfolio-balance eect," it would have the opposite
sign to the one expected from the theory.
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possibility. What the gure does show is that at any rate there seems to be fairly
eective arbitrage between the OIS market and the market for Treasuries. It does not
in itself prove that there is also eective arbitrage between the markets for bonds of
dierent maturities, but as an indication that there were still traders looking out for
arbitrage opportunities in the xed-income markets, even in late 2008 and in 2009,
it might incline one to nd that hypothesis more likely.
Gagnon et al. (2011) consider the issue of the extent to which the changes in
long-term bond yields that they measure may be due to changed expectations of the
future path of short-term interest rates, using an estimated arbitrage-free dynamic
term-structure model (DTSM) due to Kim and Wright (2005) to decompose changes
in bond yields into a part reecting the change in the rationally-anticipated average
level of short rates and a part reecting a change in the size of the term premium.
Using this approach, they conclude that 71 basis points of the cumulative decline in
the 10-year bond yield represented a reduction in the 10-year term premium, rather
than the expectations component.55 They then propose this term premium eect as
a measure of the eect on the bond yield due to Fed asset purchases, rather than
to eects of the FOMC announcements on the expected path of short rates. Their
estimate of the cumulative eect of the $1.75 trillion of purchases under LSAP1 on
the 10-year term premium is in fact the result that Gagnon et al. emphasize, and
propose as the basis for an estimate of the further reductions in long-term interest
rates that could be expected from additional purchases of long-term bonds.56
This conclusion, however, should not necessarily be taken at face value. Bauer and
Rudebusch (2011) argue, based on the work of Bauer et al. (2012), that the approach
to DTSM estimation used by Kim and Wright results in biased coecient estimates
that exaggerate the degree of mean-reversion of the short-rate process, and conse-
quently attribute too high a share of the movement in long rates to changes in term
premia. They nd that an LSAP1 event study focusing on the same eight announce-
55As Bauer and Rudebusch discuss, the cumulative decline in the tted 10-year bond yield using
the Kim-Wright model is actually 102 basis points (and not the 91-basis-point decline of the actual
bond yields), so that this calculation still attributes 33 basis points of decline in the 10-year bond
yield to the expectations component.
56Rather than emphasizing the 71-basis-point estimate alone, they present results from a variety
of possible approaches, leading to a range of estimates of the cumulative reduction in the term
premium, and conclude that it \appears to be somewhere between 30 and 100 basis points, with
most estimates in the lower and middle thirds of this range" (p. 38).
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ment dates as Gagnon et al., but using term premia estimates based on a DTSM
with reduced bias, nds a much larger role for changes in the expected path of short
rates as an explanation for the declines in bond yields on those dates. Their point
estimates suggest that about half of the cumulative decline in 10-year bond yields
can be attributed to the expectations channel, though they stress that with a rela-
tively unrestricted DTSM specication, the condence intervals for a decomposition
of this kind are wide, so that neither the \all-expectations" nor the \all-term-premia"
hypothesis can be rejected.
This emphasis on the fragility of any conclusions obtained from DTSM estimation
is surely correct. Apart from the general sensitivity of such estimation results to
the details of model specication, one must particularly doubt the validity of any
conclusions obtained by assuming that a model of interest-rate dynamics estimated
using data prior to the nancial crisis will continue to be valid in a period when the
federal funds rate is constrained by the zero lower bound.57 Moreover, even if one
were to accept the conclusion of Gagnon et al. (2011), according to which much of the
decline in long-term bond yields on LSAP1 announcement days was due to declines
in term premia on those days, rather than to changes in the expectations component
of bond yields, this would not necessarily indicate the existence of portfolio-balance
eects. After all, changes in the expected evolution of short rates should also eect
term premia, and not just the expectations component. Suppose that FOMC forward
guidance were to convince market participants that there was no possibility of a
funds rate above zero for the next ten years. In such a case, an absence of arbitrage
opportunities would require the ten-year zero-coupon yield to fall to zero as well |
meaning that both the expectations component and the term premium would be
reduced to zero by such a change in expectations about the short-rate process. While
the example is extreme, it illustrates a general principle: term premia are aected
by expectations about the short-rate process (in particular, the degree of uncertainty
about future short rates).
57Swanson and Williams (2012) present a variety of types of interesting evidence showing that
interest-rate dynamics have been dierent since late 2008, some of which has been discussed above
in section 1.2.2.
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3.2.3 Further Channels for Policy Eects
Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2011) instead seek to extend the event-study
methodology of Gagnon et al. (2011), both by increasing the set of announcement
dates studied to include FOMC announcements relating to the LSAP2 program,58
and by looking at market movements on announcement days of a larger set of nan-
cial instruments, so as to be able to discriminate among a more nely-dierentiated
set of possible hypotheses about the channels through which central-bank purchases
aect nancial markets. For example, they consider a larger set of ways in which
nancial markets may have moved as a result of changed expectations about future
macroeconomic conditions. In addition to the hypothesis of a change in the expected
path of short-term interest rates also considered by Gagnon et al. (and called by
these authors the \signalling channel"), they also consider the possibility of changes
in the expected future rate of ination, and changes in the degree of uncertainty
about future ination.
Like Bauer and Rudebusch, they nd evidence that market yields were aected
through the \signalling channel" in the case of LSAP1 announcements. Krishna-
murthy and Vissing-Jorgensen base their conclusion on the shift downward in the
expected future path of the federal funds rate indicated by fed funds futures prices
on LSAP1 announcement days. They interpret the shift in the implied forward curve
as a shift farther into the future of the funds-rate increases that were expected even-
tually to occur, and conclude that their ve LSAP1 announcement days resulted in
a cumulative shift of the expected timing of funds-rate increases to be later by more
than six months. They similarly nd evidence for the signalling channel in the case
of the LSAP2 announcements, though the eects of the LSAP2 announcements were
smaller (both through this channel and overall).
They also argue, by looking at movements in ination-protected bonds as well as
nominal bonds, and at options prices, that LSAP announcements both increased the
expected rate of ination and reduced ination uncertainty (presumably by lowering
the probability attached to deationary \tail risk"); again they nd some evidence
58At the same time, they reduce the number of LSAP1 announcement dates in their study, on the
ground that including questionable dates could bias their conclusions about the relative importance
of the dierent channels through which LSAP announcements aected markets, while excluding
valid dates should only reduce the power of their hypothesis tests. See the Appendix for the ve
LSAP1 dates and two LSAP2 dates included in their study.
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of both ination channels in the case of both LSAP1 and LSAP2 announcements.
Like their conclusions about the signalling channel, these results indicate that -
nancial markets were aected through expectational channels that are more indirect
than the simple expectation of a mechanical eect of asset purchases on the market
price of the assets purchased. One cannot say from these results alone why market
participants changed their beliefs about future ination. One interpretation could
be that they expected the eventual Fed asset purchases to stimulate the economy
through channels unrelated to the path of the federal funds rate; but another would
be that the expected path of ination changed because of what the announcement
signalled about future interest-rate policy. In the latter case, while the eect on asset
prices would not occur purely as a consequence of the expectations theory of the
term structure, these \channels" would also reect the information that the FOMC
statements contained about likely future interest-rate policy, and not necessarily any
portfolio-balance eects of asset purchases.
Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen also use their comparisons of the eects of
the announcements on dierent nancial instruments to look for eects on a variety
of possible types of risk premia, that one would expect to change if portfolio-balance
eects were important. They nd little or no evidence of a \duration-risk channel" of
the kind emphasized by Gagnon et al. (2011), according to which purchases of long-
term bonds (of whatever type) should reduce a duration-risk premium common to all
assets of a given duration. This is the theory under which Fed purchases of long-term
Treasuries would be expected to reduce yields not only on those Treasury securities
but on mortgage-backed securities and corporate bonds of similar duration as well
| and hence the primary justication that has been oered for expecting desirable
macroeconomic eects from programs like LSAP2 or MEP. They instead nd that
the eects of the LSAP1 announcements provide some evidence of a \prepayment risk
channel" (under which Fed purchases of MBS reduced a risk premium that is specic
to mortgage-related securities) and a \safety channel" (under which Fed purchases of
safe assets, such as Treasuries or agency debt, increases the scarcity of such assets,
lowering the yield on them relative to less-safe assets such as MBS or lower-rated
corporate bonds).
Eects of the latter type are most naturally interpreted as portfolio-balance eects;
for example, the \prepayment risk channel" could be expected to be important if the
MBS market were segmented, with a class of specialized arbitrageurs who operate
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predominantly in the MBS market being the main ones to determine the size of
the prepayment risk premium. But the authors nd no role for a \prepayment risk
channel" in the case of the LSAP2 announcements; in these cases, they nd that the
eects on MBS yields can be fully explained by the change in expectations of the
future path of the federal funds rate. This might simply reect the fact that LSAP2
did not involve further purchases of MBS; but it leaves open the possibility that the
\prepayment risk channel" was important in the case of LSAP1 only because of the
unusual disruption of the markets involved in mortgage securitization in 2008 and
2009. The degree of market segmentation required for such eects to be important
might not characterize periods in which nancial markets function more normally.
While Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen again nd evidence of a \safety chan-
nel" in the case of the LSAP2 announcements, they note that this channel is of little
relevance for \the nominal rates that are most important for households and many
corporations | mortgage rates and rates on lower-grade corporate bonds" (p. 255).
They conclude that the eects of LSAP2 on these interest rates occurred mainly
through the signalling channel or the two ination channels | which is to say, through
expectational channels that may simply have reected changes in forecasts of future
interest-rate policy.
The nding that an important part of the eects of the FOMC's LSAP announce-
ment came through expectational channels implies that a central bank would do well
to give careful consideration to the signal about future policy that its announcement
is intended to convey. The expectational eects were evidently not solely the conse-
quence of explicit statements by the FOMC about future interest rates, and it may be
(though it is hard to be certain) that the fact of the intended purchases was itself an
important signal. Nonetheless, it would make sense to be explicit about the implica-
tions of such a decision for future policy, if one wants to have some degree of control
over the inferences that are drawn, rather than leaving it to market participants to
draw what inferences they may.
Furthermore, ndings of Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen suggest that, to
the extent that there are portfolio-balance eects of Fed asset purchases, they are
unlikely to be of the type relied upon as justication for the FOMC's LSAP2 and
MEP programs. There seems little reason to believe that purchases of long-term
Treasuries should be an eective way of lowering the kind of longer-term interest
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rates that matter most for stimulating economic activity.59 If one's goal is to lower
the yields on mortgage-backed securities in order to increase the availability of credit
in the mortgage market, purchases of MBS are more likely to be eective, though even
purchases of that kind would not necessarily be as eective under current conditions
as they were under the unusual circumstances of 2009.60
4 Concluding Reections
I have reviewed some of the leading approaches to the provision of additional monetary
accommodation after the interest-rate lower bound is reached, both in the theoretical
literature and among recent policy experiments. While it is dicult to be certain
about the eects of such policies without a greater body of experience than is so far
available, some provisional conclusions may be possible. The results that we have
do not imply that the task of a central banker under current conditions is an easy
one; there seem to me to be fewer options that are likely to be eective, and that
are likely to be attractive on other grounds, than central bankers sometimes suggest
when seeking to reassure the public.
Central bankers confronting the problem of the interest-rate lower bound have
tended to be especially attracted to proposals that oer the prospect of additional
monetary stimulus while (i) not requiring the central bank to commit itself with regard
to future policy decisions, and (ii) purporting to alter general nancial conditions in
a way that should aect all parts of the economy relatively uniformly, so that the
central bank can avoid involving itself in decisions about the allocation of credit.
Unfortunately, the belief that methods exist that can be eective while satisfying
these two desiderata seems to depend to a great extent on wishful thinking.
On the one hand, a number of central banks have sought to give signals about the
likely future evolution of their policy rates, in order to inuence current longer-term
interest rates and hence, hopefully, current spending decisions; but this has typically
been done in a way that avoids actually making any promises about how future
59The eects of Treasuries purchases on the market yields of Treasuries can furthermore be taken
as an indication that such purchases actually reduce welfare, as discussed above in section 3.1 and
in Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2012b).
60There is also some question as to how well reductions in MBS yields are currently being passed
through to mortgage loan rates (Bauer, 2012).
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policy decisions will be made, and in particular without giving listeners any reason to
suppose that future decisions will be made on anything but a purely forward-looking
basis. It is unclear why announcements of this form should have the desired eect, and
on at least some occasions they seem to have little eect. Moreover, simply presenting
a forecast that the policy rate will remain lower for longer than had previously been
expected, in the absence of any reason to believe that future policy decisions will be
made in a dierent way, runs the risk of being interpreted as simply an announcement
that the future is likely to involve lower real income growth and/or lower ination
than had previously been anticipated | information that, if believed, should have
a contractionary rather than an expansionary eect (though it might lead long-term
interest rates and indicators of interest-rate expectations to decline).
To the extent that central banks have been willing to make explicit commitments
about the future conduct of policy, it has most often been to underline their commit-
ment not to allow higher ination than would correspond to their normal, long-run
ination target, even temporarily. Thus, in the case of the Federal Reserve, the intro-
duction of more explicit forms of forward guidance and aggressive expansions of the
Fed balance sheet have been accompanied by assurances that these policies should
in no way suggest that there will be any relaxation of the FOMC's vigilance when
it comes to preventing any increase in ination. Such assurances tend to contradict
precisely the kind of signals that one would want such policies to send in order for
them to be eective in providing people a reason to spend more. They imply that
simultaneous forecasts of low nominal interest rates for a longer time must indeed
reect pessimism about the speed of the economy's recovery rather than any change
in the criterion that will be used to determine the appropriate timing of the interest-
rate \lift-o"; and they work to reduce the extent to which asset purchases can aect
the economy through either the \signalling channel" or the \ination risk channel"
found to be important by Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2011).
A more useful form of forward guidance, I believe, would be one that emphasizes
the target criterion that will be used to determine when it is appropriate to raise the
federal funds rate target above its current level, rather than estimates of the \lift-o"
date. If such an explicit criterion made it clear that short-term interest rates will not
immediately be increased as soon as a Taylor rule descriptive of past FOMC behavior
would justify a funds rate above 25 basis points, this would provide a reason for market
participants to expect easier future monetary and nancial conditions than they may
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currently be anticipating, and that should both ease current nancial conditions and
provide an incentive for increased spending. An example of a suitable target criterion
would be a commitment to return nominal GDP to the trend path that it had been
on up until the fall of 2008. This would both make it clear that policy will have
to remain looser in the near term than a purely forward-looking Taylor rule would
imply, and at the same time provide assurance that the unusually stimulative current
policy stance does not imply any intention to tolerate continuing ination above the
Fed's declared long-run ination target | that in fact, it will not lead to a future
level of nominal income any higher than what people had reason to anticipate at the
time that they acquired their existing nominal assets and undertook their existing
nominal obligations.
An obvious question about such a proposal remains: is there nothing the central
bank can do to make people believe that it can and will achieve such a target, apart
from declaring the target? Here I think it is important to recognize that a nominal
GDP level target | unlike a target for the near-term rate of GDP growth, the near-
term rate of ination, or any other target tied to a specic horizon | need not lose
credibility simply because the announcement fails to shift behavior immediately; for a
lack of immediate progress in closing the nominal GDP gap would not be a reason to
doubt that easier policy later would still be used to the extent necessary to close the
gap | it would simply move the date by which that is expected to occur farther into
the future. Nonetheless, it would undeniably be useful to be able to complement the
announcement of the target with measures that would create immediate movement
toward the target, without this movement depending entirely on the credibility of the
achievement of the target | precisely in order to make the achievement of the target
credible, whether it initially is or not.
Some argue that a vigorous program of \quantitative easing" is the obvious way
to show that a central bank can and will act immediately, rather than simply waiting
for expectations to change as a result of its announcements. But this argument pre-
sumes that central-bank asset purchases can stimulate additional spending, in ways
not solely reliant upon expectational channels. Yet while central banks like the Fed-
eral Reserve and the Bank of England have been willing to expand the size of their
balance sheets rather dramatically in response to the recent crisis, they have often
preferred to do this by purchasing extremely safe Treasury securities (the only kind of
purchases undertaken under the FOMC's most recent two asset purchase programs,
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the LSAP2 and MEP programs, for example), in the hope that such purchases will
improve general nancial conditions without more direct involvement by the central
bank in extending credit to particular sectors of the economy. Unfortunately, neither
of the theories typically relied upon to explain why that should be the case | the
quantity-theoretic doctrine that expansion of the monetary base must inevitably lead
to increased aggregate nominal spending, or the particular kind of preferred-habitat
model of the term structure that would imply the existence of a \duration-risk chan-
nel" | has a robust theoretical basis (in the sense of following from hypotheses
that seem likely to be true, rather than relying upon special assumptions that might
nonetheless conceivably be true) or nds much support from experience thus far.
It might nonetheless be argued that such purchases can be helpful as ways of
changing expectations about future policy | essentially, as a type of signalling that
can usefully supplement purely verbal forms of forward guidance. And one possible
interpretation of the ndings of Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2011) that
the Fed's LSAP programs have aected bond yields through expectational channels
is that these purchases have been interpreted as signals about future policy. But if
a central bank's intention in announcing such purchases is to send such a signal, the
signal would seem more likely to have the desired eect if accompanied by explicit
forward guidance, rather than regarded as a substitute for it.
Asset purchases also seem more likely to change expectations about future policy
in a desired way if the purchases are rationally related to the future policy that they
are intended to signal. For example, is there really a reason for a large expansion in
the supply of bank reserves now to indicate that policy will also be more expansionary
after the lower bound ceases to be a binding constraint? In the thought experiment
of Auerbach and Obstfeld (2005), one could argue that such a connection exists: the
immediate expansion of the monetary base could be taken as a signal that the future
monetary base will permanently be higher, because the immediate increase is of the
the same size as the permanent increase that one wants people to anticipate. It is true
that there is no logical necessity for the long-run increase in the monetary base to be
the same as the immediate increase; but it is at least a fairly simple and intuitively
plausible idea to get across. (An announcement that the current increase in base
money is intended to be permanent is more likely to be understood and believed than
an announcement that the monetary base will be permanently increased at some
future date, where both the date of the future action and the motive for the changed
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behavior at that time would likely seem obscure.) But the kinds of large increases in
the monetary base associated with \quantitative easing" in Japan or with the Fed's
recent programs do not suggest particular expectations about future policy in the
same way: the expansions have been much too large for any plausible suggestion that
they are intended to be permanent, nor is the size of the expansion tied in any obvious
way to any aspect of the central bank's future targets that one might be trying to
signal.
Clouse et al. (2000) suggest that purchases of long-term bonds might be a way
of signalling a commitment to keep short-term interest rates low in the future, on
the ground that the change in the central bank's balance sheet would then leave it
vulnerable to capital losses in the event that it were to raise short-term rates sooner
than it had wished people to believe it would. But it would be hard to defend the
use of such a policy as a signal in order not to have to make any verbal commitments
about policy. Compared to a verbal commitment to a history-dependent criterion
for making later policy decisions, such as a nominal GDP target path, a don't-talk-
but-buy-assets plan runs both a greater risk of tying the central bank's hands in a
way that turns out to be awkward ex post | because it cannot allow an interest-rate
commitment that is contingent on how the economy subsequently evolves | and a
greater risk of failing to inuence expectations in the desired way, because it relies
upon market participants to correctly analyze the central bank's future incentives
rather than directly stating its intentions. The proposal is somewhat more appealing
if intended as a complement to a verbal commitment, since in that case the intended
signal should be clearer. But it remains an awkward and possibly costly form of signal,
because the thing that the central bank should wish to signal is not a commitment
to keep interest rates low for a xed calendar period, but rather a commitment to
maintain policy accommodation until the nominal GDP target path is reached.
A more logical policy would rely on a combination of commitment to a clear target
criterion to guide future decisions about interest-rate policy with immediate policy
actions that should stimulate spending immediately without relying too much on
expectational channels. Neither a program of expanding the supply of bank reserves
nor a program of expanding the central bank's holdings of longer-term Treasury
securities is a good example of the latter kind of policy. Additional purchases of MBS
by the Fed might instead still be useful as a way of reducing the cost of mortgage
borrowing, though it is hard to be certain that additional purchases now would reduce
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MBS yields by the amount that the Fed's purchases under LSAP1 apparently did,
given the less perilous situation of private nancial intermediaries now, and it is hard
to be certain that reductions in MBS yields would be passed on to mortgage rates.
A kind of policy more certain to expand mortgage lending would be one like the
Funding for Lending Scheme (FLS) recently announced by the Bank of England and
the UK Treasury, which subsidizes lenders for increasing the amount of loans that
they make.
Of course, it is not necessarily up to the central bank alone to institute policies of
that kind, that can more directly inuence private-sector decisions, for such actions
are more properly viewed as part of scal policy. It is probably no accident that
the FLS is a joint project of the Bank of England and the Treasury. And indeed,
more generally, the most obvious recipe for success is one that requires coordination
between the monetary and scal authorities. The most obvious source of a boost to
current aggregate demand that would not depend solely on expectational channels is
scal stimulus | whether through an increase in government purchases, tax incentives
for current expenditure such as an investment tax credit, or subsidies for lending like
the FLS. At the same time, commitment to a nominal GDP target path by the
central bank would increase the bang for the buck from scal stimulus, by assuring
people that premature interest-rate increases in response to rising economic activity
and prices would not crowd out other types of spending than those directly aected
by scal policy. And the existence of the central bank's declared nominal GDP
target path should also limit the degree of alarm that might arise about risks of
unbridled ination when special scal stimulus measures are introduced. For those
who worry that scal stimulus always comes too late and goes too far, there would
be the central bank's commitment to revert to a policy of active control of aggregate
demand through monetary policy once the nominal GDP target path is reached.
Is the coordination between monetary and scal authorities required for such a
solution in the realm of the possible? The UK's Funding for Lending Scheme is at
least a demonstration that coordination can occur. And while central bankers cannot
bring about such coordination on their own, agreement among themselves about what
needs to be done is surely a rst prerequisite for such cooperation to be imaginable.
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A Appendix: FOMC Announcement Dates for
Asset-Purchase Programs
This appendix lists the announcement dates used in the various event studies dis-
cussed in section 3.2. All 14 dates listed below are used in Figure 18. The rst
8 dates (the LSAP1 dates) are used in the event studies of Gagnon et al. (2011)
and Bauer and Rudebusch (2011). The event study of Krishnamurthy and Vissing-
Jorgensen (2011) [KVJ] uses data for both the LSAP1 and LSAP2 dates below, with
the exception of those dates indicated in the footnotes. (Their study is thus based on
a subset of only ve of the LSAP1 dates and only two of the LSAP2 dates.) Figure
17, taken from Campbell et al. (2012), marks as \LSAP dates" each of the seven
dates used by KVJ, except for 12/1/2008 (which does not appear in the gure as it
was not an ocial announcement by the FOMC), and also marks as an \LSAP date"




11/25/2008 The Federal Reserve will purchase \up to $100 billion in GSE direct
obligations," and \up to $500 billion in MBS."
12/01/2008 In a speech, Chairman Bernanke states that the Federal Reserve
\could purchase longer-term Treasury or agency securities...in sub-
stantial quantities."a
12/16/2008 The FOMC \anticipates...exceptionally low levels of the federal
funds rate for some time." It also \stands ready to expand its pur-
chases of agency debt and mortgage-backed securities...[and] is also
evaluating the potential benets of purchasing longer-term Trea-
sury securities."




03/18/2009 The FOMC \anticipates...exceptionally low levels of the federal
funds rate for an extended period." It will also purchase \up to
an additional $750 billion of agency mortgage-backed securities,"
\up to $100 billion" in agency debt, and \up to $300 billion of
longer-term Treasury securities over the next six months."
08/12/2009 The FOMC \decided to gradually slow the pace" of Treasury pur-
chases (\up to" language with reference to Treasury purchases is
also removed).b
09/23/2009 The FOMC \will gradually slow the pace of" of agency MBS pur-
chases (\up to" language with reference to agency MBS purchases
is also removed).b
11/04/2009 The FOMC \will purchase...about $175 billion of agency debt" (\up
to" language with reference to agency debt is also removed).b
A.2 LSAP2 Dates
Date Announcement
08/10/2010 The FOMC will reinvest \principal payments from agency debt and
agency mortgage-backed securities in longer-term Treasury securi-
ties."
08/27/2010 In a speech, Chairman Bernanke announces that \additional pur-
chases of longer-term securities...would be eective in further easing
nancial conditions."c
09/21/2010 The FOMC \is prepared to provide additional accommodation if
needed."
aExcluded by Campbell et al. (2012) as not an ocial announcement of the FOMC, though
included by KVJ.
bExcluded by KVJ as a minor announcement.
cExcluded by KVJ as not an ocial announcement of the FOMC.
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Date Announcement
11/03/2010 The FOMC \intends to purchase a further $600 billion of longer-
term Treasury securities by the end of the second quarter of 2011,
a pace of about $75 billion per month."d
A.3 MEP Dates
Date Announcement
09/21/2011 The FOMC \intends to purchase, by the end of June 2012, $400
billion of Treasury securities with remaining maturities of 6 years
to 30 years and to sell an equal amount of Treasury securities with
remaining maturities of 3 years or less."
06/20/2012 The FOMC \decided to continue through the end of the year its
program to extend the average maturity of its holdings of securi-
ties." An accompanying statement by the Federal Reserve Bank
of New York claries that this continuation will \result in the pur-
chase, as well as the sale and redemption, of about $267 billion in
Treasury securities by the end of 2012."
dExcluded by KVJ as the announcement had been widely anticipated, and the news may actually
have been smaller purchases than anticipated, but included by Campbell et al. (2012).
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